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Resource Conservation

Evaluating Community Forestry in Huai Lu Luang, Thailand
Chairperson: Steve Siebert
Forest tenure and the acquisition of land deeds for forest dwellers in Thailand
remain problematic and inconsistent. The Royal Forestry Department (RFD) governs
state forests in this politically decentralized country, with the state parlimentary
government drafting, sometimes conflicting policies, to resolve conflict with forest
dwellers. This study was conducted in the predominantly ethnic Black Lahu village of
Huai Lu Luang in the Chiang Rai province. The village resides on RFD land designated
as a forest reserve. With the possibility of the enactment of a parliamentary based
community forestry bill, establishment of an RFD Mae Kok River Basin National Park,
or the procurement of a chanod chumcon (community land deed), Huai Lu Luang’s
current de facto land use rights are tenuous.
This research incorporated Elinor Ostrom’s (2002) framework of resource and
resource user attributes for successful self-governance of common pool resource
management, as a means of evaluating the feasibility of community-based management
of Huai Lu Luang’s community forest. Methods included participant observations, survey
interviews, and key informant interviews from September to October 2010. The 32
survey interviews were selected through non-probability sampling to include an equal
number of male and female interviewees in three age categories of 18-34, 35-50, and
50+, with two additional interviewees to represent the Akha and Yellow Lahu minorities
in the village.
Research results indicate that Huai Lu Luang complies strongly to very strongly
with 73% of Ostrom’s attributes and moderately with 27%. Resource attributes indicate
that Huai Lu Luang’s community forest has the capacity for feasible improvement, the
predictable flow of resource units, and a manageable spatial extent. Huai Lu Luang
appropriators exhibit governance capabilities, a high dependency on community forest
resources, and a significant sense of village trust and unity. The community forest design
is also appropriate to the local conditions time, space, ecology, and technology. This
research indicates that Huai Lu Luang village is capable of successfully self-governing
their community forest on a sustainable basis, suggesting that Huai Lu Luang is a strong
candidate for a chanod chumchom.
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Preface
Jamlong Pawkham (Ajan Jamlong) aptly described the situation of Huai Lu
Luang as “Yung Mak,” meaning very entangled. Nothing could describe the situation
more perfectly. Huai Lu Luang was selected as my study site because of my prior work
experience with the village, Upland Holistic Development Project’s (UHDP) long
involvement in the village, and because the village does not have many remittent
workers. Prior to the interviews for this paper, my previous work at UHDP had already
acquainted me with the predicament of Huai Lu Luang’s community forest and its many
layers. As a volunteer for UHDP from January to June 2007, I worked on counter
mapping efforts for the community forests of villages in Mae Yao sub-district, including
Huai Lu Luang. This included an overnight visit in April 2007 with UHDP co-director
Bunsak Thongdi (Ajan Tui), hiking the boundaries of their community forest with the
community forest committee, and recording GPS waypoints. Later, in May 2007, I
conducted GPS use trainings for members of Huai Lu Luang’s community forest
committee, as well as for neighboring communities. In the subsequent year, 2008, I
became the go-between person for my sponsoring American NGO, Plant With Purpose,
using interviews with UHDP staff members and visits to all eight villages in Mae Yao
sub-district to keep Plant with Purpose abreast of the political situation in Mae Yao subdistrict as it related to the livelihoods and community forests of eight partner villages in
this sub-district.
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Ajan Jamlong and Ajan Tui, the co-directors of UHDP, helped me to design this
project while I was still in Thailand in 2008/2009. Foreseeing that the ongoing conflict
between the villages in Mae-Yao and the Royal Forestry Department wouldn’t abate
within the next year, we decided that this project should include practical solutions for
the communities in question and aid the work of UHDP and other local NGOs working
with similar situations. Therefore, although sections of this paper write like a traditional
thesis, other sections were designed with the specific output for UHDP or Huai Lu
Luang.

Terms
Acronyms
RFD: Royal Forestry Department
UDHP: Upland Holistic Development Project
MMF: Mekong Minority Foundation
NTFPs: Non-timber forest products
NGO: Non-government organization
RECOFTC: The Center for Peoples and Resources
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
CODI: Community Organizations Development Institute
UDD: United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship
PAD: People’s Alliance for Democracy
PPP: People’s Power Party
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Definitions
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this topic and precision that is needed when
discussing the topics of community forestry, forest rights, and tenure, this list of
definitions is supplied for clarity and consistency of meaning.

Tenure Rights: A buddle of rights, including access and use rights, management,
exclusion, and alienation (Schlager and Ostrom, 2002 as sited in Larson et al, 2010, p.
12).
Access: The right to enter an area (Larson et al, 2010, p 12).
Use: The right to obtain resources and remove them from the forest. (Larson et al, 2010,
p. 12).
Management: The right to regulate usage or transform the resource (Agrawal and
Ostrom, 2001, p. 489 as sited in Larson et al, 2010, p. 12).
Exclusion: The right to decide who can and cannot use the resource (Larson et al, 2010,
p. 12).
Alienation: The sale of lease of the land, which also includes the sale of other tenure
rights (Larson et al, 2010, p. 12).
De facto rights: Patterns of interaction established outside the formalities of law. They
can include customary rights (Larson et al, 2010, p. 12-13).
Customary rights: A set of community rules and regulations inherited from ancestors of
which the community accepts, reinterprets, and enforces them. They may or may not be
recognized by the state (Larson et al, 2010, p. 12-13).
Forest Tenure Reform: “A change of one or more rights regarding forest resource and
forest land management (Bruce, 1998 as sited in Larson et al, 2010). This usually
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involves granting rights to people already living in or near forests and using forest
resources.” (Larson et al, 2010, p. 13)
Tenure security: “The degree to which an individual or groups believes its relationship to
land or other resources is safe, rather than in jeopardy (Poffenberger, 1990 as sited in
Larson et al, 2010, p. 13).”
Community Forestry: “Understood broadly as a common property resource management
approach with characteristics and institutional innovations devised by local people
(Chapagain et al, 1999 as sited in Larson et al, 2010) to organize and exercise their rights
for the use and management of a forest area for the supply of forest products” and can
include those projects promoted by the state or donors. (Larson et al, 2010, p. 13)
Chanod Tidin: Land ownership through a title deed, giving unrestricted ownership rights,
but can be issued only after a cadastral survey (Thai Government.)
Chanod Chumchon: A communal title deed, similar to a chanod tidin, in giving land
ownership through a title deed. A chanod chumchon, however, gives unrestricted
ownership rights to a pre-defined community, preventing usage or sale to non-community
members.
Ampoe: District level government composed of at least two tamboon. The District Chief
Office is appointed by the Department of Provincial Administration and Ministry of the
Interior. (Thai Government)
Tamboon: Sub-district level government. The sub-district headman is elected directly by
villagers of that sub-district and works under the supervision of the District chief officers,
with a five year term. (Thai Government)
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Indigenous peoples: A non-dominant group of people with a shared history, language,
and culture residing in a common geographic area. Non-state people not participating in
an industrial mode of production and are thus vulnerable in relation to modernization and
the state (Eriksen, 1993 as sited in McCaskill and Kampe, 1997, p. 3).
Hill tribe: In Thailand the term used to describe indigenous peoples more commonly
residing in upland areas (McCaskill and Kampe, 1997, p. 4).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Few resources generate conflict as quickly or contentiously as access rights to
forests. The forest dwellers in the nascent national forest systems of developing countries
inspire conflicts regarding access to resources, usufruct rights, and customary rights.
These conflicts often draw international and local NGOs, government officials,
development practitioners, and conservationists into the debate (Hares, 2009, p. 381).
The proposed reforms that result from these debates are then heavily influenced by local
claims for tenure rights recognition, global concerns for conservation, and the promotion
of democratic decentralization (Larson, et al, 2010, p.14). Additionally, involving de
facto and customarily used, but unofficial, common property resources such as
community forests, further complicates this scenario.
Community forestry is a form of common pool resource management, including
institutional elements devised by local people to implement their perceived right for the
use and management of a forest area for the supply of various forest products (Larson, et
al, 2010, p. 13). In practice it draws on larger complications of defining both community
and forestry. The heterogeneous nature of communities combined with the divergent
definitions of forestry adds layers to an already broad topic. Ostrom, et al (1994)
explains that the finite quantities of resource units created by common-pool resources
means than one person’s use of that resource subtracts from the amount of resource unites
available to others.
Rapid deforestation in Thailand in the 60s and 70s encouraged NGOs, academics,
and local organizations to pursue community forestry. Buergin (2000) states that at the
1

end of the 1980s, these groups began to argue for local control of local resources through
community forests as an alternative forest conservation strategy of the RFD (p. 11). This
strategy uses community forestry as a political tool demonstrate a community’s capacity
to govern the forests. Currently there is no official state recognition of community
forests, however, unofficial establishment by villages of community forests across
northern Thailand is increasing, with studies suggesting an increase in community forests
from just 153 in 1993 to 733 in 2000, and over 90 grassroots, region-based community
forest networks established in northern Thailand (Johnson & Forsyth, 2002, p. 19).
Unlike community forestry elsewhere, villages define these community forests, not user
groups.
This study will look specifically at Huai Lu Luang village in the northern Thai
province of Chiang Rai where villagers seek recognized forest tenure to the forested land
they have de facto use rights as a community forest. The ever changing Thai political
scene encourages village unity, while the many faces of the Thai government forces them
to continually adapt their strategy and attempts at securing any form of forest tenure
reform and land tenure certificate. For Huai Lu Luang, in 1977, this meant establishing a
community forest and community forest committee and in 1995 setting aside over 5,000
rai of forested land for the Thai King, His Majesty Bhumibol Adulyadej, all in
demonstration of their forestry stewardship. In 2007, Huai Lu Luang confirmed the
boundaries of their community forest through the creation of maps, in hopes that
Parliament would pass a favorable community forest bill. In 2008 they began creating
detailed land use maps, and most recently they are preparing to submit a proposal to be a
pilot project site for a current Parliament experiment. If the pilot projects work, then the

2

Thai Government at all levels will allow communities, like Huai Lu Luang, to apply for a
Chanod chumchon (Community Land Deed), granting the community, rather than
individuals, the highest level of land security Thailand has to offer. Under a chanod
chumchon the community would have ownership of the land, including paddy fields,
upland fields, and a community forest. Although restricted from selling land to outsiders,
the community would have ownership and management control.
Challenges arise, however, from the decentralized government with conflicting
departmental interests. The agricultural department has a policy of trying to work with
communities, while the RFD places forest conservation above the needs of communities.
Furthermore, neither department has authority over the other, creating an entangled
situation for the villagers to navigate. The village in question lies within a national
forest reserve that was designated after the establishment of the village. While waiting
for the establishment of a national park, the RFD has recognized Huai Lu Luang’s de
facto rights by determining the boundaries of the paddy fields and upland fields and
through recommending guidelines over community forest management. These rights are
functional, but informal, as officially the entire village is illegally located on government
property.

Study Objectives
This study looks at the two different themes of forest tenure reform and common
pool resource management. It will incorporate a critical, context bound, site-specific
evaluation of Huai Lu Luang’s efforts to gain formal forest tenure for their community
forest. As outputs, I seek to generate future action guidelines as informed through Elinor
Ostrom’s framework of resource and resource user attributes for successful self-
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governance of common pool resource management. It is my hope that this information
can empower and inform UHDP and Huai Lu Luang’s Community Forest Committee as
they prepare a Chanod chumchon proposal. These interwoven threads highlight Huai Lu
Luang’s hope of formalizing their current de facto rights and common pool resource
management practices.
This paper will be sent to the following organizations: Plant With Purpose,
Ecological Concerns for Hunger Organization (ECHO) Asia, International Sustainable
Development Studies Institute (ISDSI), Mekong Minority Foundation, and UHDP. Each
of these organizations has a collaborative relationship with one another, a working
relationship with Huai Lu Luang, and have requested the information. In addition, with
help from ECHO Asia, this paper will be translated into Thai for the purposes of UHDPs
and ECHOs working research libraries. Moreover separate summaries of village history
and research conclusions will be written in English, translated into Thai and then Lahu
for the direct use of UHDP and Huai Lu Luang village in their efforts to obtain a Chanod
chumchon.
Research Questions:
1. To understand the context and rational that influences Huai Lu Luang’s desire for
community-based forest management.
2. To evaluate the extent to which the resource and resource users in Huai Lu Luang
compare to the criteria identified by Ostrom’s (2002) framework as critically
important for common pool resource management.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Community Forestry
Community forestry represents a form of common-pool resource management.
Hardin, in 1968 presented the case of the tragedy of the commons, suggesting that
common access resources were prone to overexploitation, such as the collapse of the of
fisheries in Newfoundland (Dietz, et al 2003). Research has since disagreed with the
simplicity of Hardin’s argument. The tragedy of the commons is not of the commons,
but instead of open access resources that lack regulation. An open access resource can
include a geographic space with unclaimed ownership or a space that has ungoverned
ownership, as is sometimes the case with state, corporate, or private owned land.
Common pool resources, conversely, include the element of governance. Chhatre and
Argawal (2008) define the common pool resource of forest commons as “forests used in
common by a large number of heterogeneous users” (p.13286). These forests have the
characteristics of defined resources boundaries, user group identity, and property rights
for resource benefits. The users also have “a stake in good governance of forest
commons and central governments formally or informally recognize local interests in and
claims to the resource” (p. 13286).
The Center for People and Forests (RECOFTC) defines community forestry as
The governance and management of forest resources by communities, in
collaboration with other stakeholders, for commercial purposes,
subsistence, timber production, non-timber forest products, wildlife,
conservation of biodiversity and environment, and for social and religious
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reasons. The arrangements for community forestry in the countries
participating in the CF Forum vary in terms of the specific rights and
responsibilities of communities and government, the types of rights held
by a community over a forest area and the types of forests covered,
potentially ranging from degraded to high value forests. (2001,
http://www.recoftc.org/site/What-is-Community-Forestry-)
In Thailand, variations of community forestry have a long history. The first king of
Chiang Mai in the late 13th century AD, King Mangrai, alluded to the concept in a law.
At this time, it was known as a sacred forest, usually found in upper watersheds, where
some communities believed in the spirit of the watershed. In the last 30 years,
competition for forest products between villages and with businessmen and a nation-wide
logging ban has caused a resurgence of community forestry efforts in Thailand. (Li 2002,
Ganjanap 1998, p. 78, Walker 2003). These community forests are often partitioned into
sacred forest (pa phi), watershed forest (pa ton nam), and the communal woodland (pa
chai soi) sections The sacred forest is reserved for ceremonial purposes as a shrine for
guardian spirits, a cremation ground, or a pagoda. These indigenous systems can be based
on the internal initiative within a local community or prompted by external agencies
(Ganjanp, 1998, p. 78).
The key to these community forests is management. Without regulation a
common-pool resource, such as a forest, can be overused or overharvested, creating a loss
in the flow of resources available (Ostrom, 2002, p. 3). Research suggests that given the
appropriate institutional design and enforcement, community-based natural resource
management, such as community forestry, has the capacity for sustainable resource
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management (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009; Dietz et al., 2003). Dietz et al., (2003) states,
“systematic multi-disciplinary research has, however, shown that a wide diversity of
adaptive governance systems have been effective stewards of many resources” (p. 1910).
By managing the flow of access to and use of a common-pool resource, multiple
appropriators can benefit from the consumption or exchange of the resources without
negative externalities or harming the access and use rights of permitted users (Ostrom,
2002, p. 2). Common-pool resource management has benefits that extend beyond the
appropriators and affect the resource. Management of a forest commons has the potential
to improve or retain forest cover, (Nagendra et al., 2008), allow the forest to endure
sustainable over an extended period of time, and facilitate forest re-growth (Nagendra,
2007). Agrawal (2009) concludes in a study of forest commons in South Asia, “indeed,
the future of biodiversity conservation may well depend upon the ability to experiment
successfully with a range of institutional forms, including those that permit human use (p.
2918)
Ostrom, writes in a 2002 article, “Reformulating the Commons,” a list of
attributes for the resource, resource user, and governance design that are conducive to
self-governance of a common-pool resource (2002, pp. 5-11). The weight of her work as
a Nobel laureate and respected scholar on the management of common pool resource is
the basis for using her list of characteristics (listed below) to inform this research. The
term appropriators is used to refer to the individuals who access or use resources from the
community forest.
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Attributes of the Resource
“R1. Feasible Improvement: Resource conditions are not at a point of
deterioration such that it is useless to organize or so underutilized that
little advantage results from organizing” (Ostrom, 2002, p 5)
It is a question of extremes. If resource units are in abundance, then there is little reason
for appropriators to spend the time and money organizing to manage the resource.
Conversely, a severely decimated resource might incur such high costs that organizing
would not generate sufficient enough benefits (Deitz et al, 2003; Ostrom 2002, p. 7).

“R2: Indicators: Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the
resource system are frequently available at a relatively low cost” (Ostrom,
2002, p. 5)
Environmental governance relies on solid, trustworthy information about flows,
processes and human interactions within a governed resource systems (Dietz, et al. 2003,
p. 1908). The presence of these indicators affects the ability of appropriators to adapt
quickly to changes that could negatively impact their long-term benefits (Ostrom, 2002,
p. 7;).

“R3: Predictability: The flow of resource units is relatively predictable”
(Ostrom, 2002, p.5).
An unpredictable, erratic resource flow makes it difficult for appropriators to ascertain
whether changes in a resource flow are due to overharvesting or to exogenous variables.
Predictable resource flows are easier to understand and manage (Ostrom, 2002, p. 7;
Dietz, et al, 2003).
8

“R4: Spatial Extent: The resource system is sufficiently small, given the
transportation and communication technology in use, that appropriators
can develop accurate knowledge of external boundaries and internal
microenvironments.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5)
Resource size affects the cost of defining the boundaries and of monitoring the resource
over time. To large a resource, within confines of technology, could be too costly and
difficult to manage. (Ostrom, 2002, p. 7; Dietz, et al., 2003).

Attributes of the Appropriators :
“A1: Salience: Appropriators are dependant on the resource system for a
major portion of their livelihood.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).
Without sufficient appropriator dependency on the resource, the high costs of organizing
and maintaining a self-governing system of management might not outweigh the benefits
received from the resource (Ostrom, 2002, p 7).

“A2: Common Understanding: Appropriators have a shared image of how
the resource system operates (attributes R1,2,3 and 4 above) and how their
actions affect each other and the resource system.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).
Effectively managing a resource depends on a common understanding of the operations
of that resource. If the appropriators have conflicting understandings of a resource it will
be difficult to agree on future strategies for managing that resource and the willingness of
appropriators to agree in a reduction of their use patterns in view of the common good
(Ostrom, 2002, p. 8).
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“A3: Low Discount Rate: Appropriators use a sufficiently low discount
rate in relation to future benefits to be achieved from the resource”
(Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).
Appropriators with other viable and attractive options outside of the self-governed
resource, discount the importance of future benefits from that self-governed resource,
with the assumption that there will always be other resources available to them (Ostrom,
2002, p. 8).

“A4: Trust and Reciprocity: Appropriators trust one another to keep
promises and relate to one another with reciprocity.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).
Trust and reciprocity amongst appropriators results in lower expected costs in the
monitoring and sanctioning of on another over time (Ostrom, 2002, p. 8).

“A5: Autonomy: Appropriators are able to determine access and
harvesting rules without external authorities countermanding them.”
(Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).
Groups with autonomy tend toward lower cots of organizing, as they are less likely too
see divergent individuals turning toward higher-level officials to countermand the efforts
of the appropriators. Also, autonomy over governance rules leads to lower costs in
defending those rules against other authorities (Ostrom, 2002, p. 8).

“A6: Prior Organizational Experience and local leadership: Appropriators
have learned at least minimal skills of organization and leadership through

10

participation in other local associations or learning about ways that
neighboring groups have organized.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).
Prior organizational experience enhances the toolbox of rules and strategies appropriators
can draw on to achieve various forms of regulation. Also, rules and regulations that are
base on current modes of operation are more likely to be agreed upon (Ostrom, 2002, p.
8).

Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring Common-Pool Resource
Institutions:
“1. Clearly Defined Boundaries: Individuals or households with rights to
withdraw resource units from the common-pool resource and the
boundaries of the common-pool resource itself are clearly defined.”
(Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).
If appropriators do not understand boundaries of the resource, the chance of unintentional
rule breaking increases.

“2. Congruence: a) The distribution of benefits from appropriation rules is
roughly proportionate to the cost imposed by provision rules. b)
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology and/or quantity of
resource units are related to local conditions.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).
This design principle encompasses two components. First, the rules need to be
considered fair and legitimate by the participants, which often indicates a proportionate
relationship between the benefits and costs of regulations. Secondly, the rules need to be
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relevant and appropriate to local conditions, such as the soils, slope, or climate (Ostrom,
2002, p. 11).

“3. Collective –Choice Arrangements: Most individuals affected by the
operational rules can participate in modifying operational rules” (Ostrom,
2002, p. 11).
If appropriators are not involved in the decision making process, their understanding of
the benefits ands costs of their system is not taken into account, and if they are prevented
from making proposals for change, they may perceive the costs of adhering to the current
governance system as higher than the benefits received from it and they might begin to
cheat. In this situation, enforcement costs become high or the system altogether fails
(Ostrom, 2002, p. 12).

“4. Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit common-pool resource
conditions and appropriator behavior, are accountable to the appropriators
and/or are the appropriators themselves.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).
Even when the level of agreement of the design of a system is high, conditions may tempt
some individuals to cheat. If one person cheats, while others conform, that individual
benefits substantially against others, and adversely affects the survivability of that system
(Ostrom, 2002, p. 12).

“5. Graduated Sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are
likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and
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context of the offense) from other appropriators, from officials
accountable to these appropriators, or from both.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).
Graduated sanctions allow for first time offenses to be minor, while appropriators who
continue to cheat receive higher sanctions. This tells appropriators that cheating gets
noticed and are enforced, and causes rule breaking to become an unattractive option for
the individual breaking the rules (Ostrom, 2002, p. 12).

“6. Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms. Appropriators and their officials
have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among
appropriators or between appropriators and officials.” (Ostrom, 2002, p.
11).
In the field, the rules drafted to manage the system might not always seem clear. If these
disagreements are not resolved in a low-cost and orderly manner than appropriators may
no longer wish to conform to the rules (Ostrom, 2002, p. 12).

“7. Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize. The rights of
appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by
external governmental authorities” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).
When the self-governing rights of a group are recognized nationally, regionally, and
locally by governments, this places greater legitimacy on the rules crafted by those
appropriators and they are less likely to be challenge in courts, administrative, or
legislative settings (Ostrom, 2002, p. 12).
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All of the factors listed above impact the effectiveness of a community’s
resilience. Community resilience refers to the capacity of a community to adapt to
changing economic, demographic, land use, worldview, educational and climatic
conditions (Belsky, personal communication, 3/23/10). This adaptability relies on
concepts of bolstering various levels of capital within a community, including
intellectual, social, human, natural, built, and financial capital (Ratner and Moser, 2009).
In each of these, the level of equity of participation within a community and the degree
and form that devolution takes, impacts their level of adaptability. Dietz et al., (2003)
states,
Institutions must be designed to allow for adaptation because some current
understanding is likely to be wrong, the required scale of organization can
shift, and biophysical and social systems change. Fixed rules are likely to
fail because they place too much confidence in the current state of
knowledge, whereas systems that guard against the low probability, high
con-sequence possibilities and allow for change may be suboptimal in the
short run but prove wiser in the long run. This is a principal lesson of
adaptive management research. (p. 1910)
Additionally, if only one ethnic group, social class, or gender within a community
participates in governance of the community forest, that may negatively impact: 1) social
capital, particularly regarding the degree of trust and strength of relationships and
networks; 2) human capital, especially regarding the utilization of skills and labor among
all members of a community; and 3) intellectual capital, including accessing all available
knowledge and innovation (Ratner and Moser, 2009).
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Thailand’s Forestry History
To better understand the context of Huai Lu Luang community forest, it’s
important to understand the governance history of forests in Thailand. Unlike its
Southeast Asian neighbors, Thailand remained free from official colonization. Thailand
avoided the wave of colonization through their quick adoption of western-style property
systems and their role as a buffer between the colonial giants of Britain and France (Sato,
2000, p. 159). Notwithstanding, the colonial powers still exerted great influence in
Thailand and shaped its history. The 1855 Bowring Treaty with the British, for instance,
opened Thailand up to the global market economy, with rice exports to western Europe
and China and teak to the Europeans to use for ships (p. 159).

During the late

nineteenth century the expanding teak industry in the north of Thailand began some
large-scale conservation of trees. Prior to these efforts, logging of teak had been
conducted largely by feudal chiefs in Laos and operated by Burmese and Chinese
merchants. However, as teak became a profitable industry, companies began to demand
that the central government take control of the situation and impose restrictions on timber
extraction to ensure the long-term prosperity of the industry. This unity of interest
between the Thai government and Western timber companies catalyzed the first efforts to
address questions of forest lease and ownership, royalty collection, conversion and
conservation of forested lands in Thailand (pp. 159-160). Established in 1896, the Royal
Forestry Department (RFD) was made responsible for all lands neither cultivated nor
claimed by any other person or state authority (Buergin, 2000, p. 9). The need to define
land and ownership forced the government to launch a cadastral survey to prepare for
their adoption of western-style property systems, basing land ownership on individual
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holdings. The first survey began in 1901 and became the basis for tax collection in cash
(Sato, 2000, p. 159). During this time, almost 75% of the total land area fell into the
purview of the RFD (Buergin, 2000, p. 9).
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, the RFD mainly concerned
themselves with the allocation and control of concessions for teak extractions. Buergin
(2000) states “territorial control of the vast areas under the administration of the RFD was
neither interesting nor feasible” (p. 9). In 1913, the RFD extended its protection to cover
non-teak trees with the Forest Protection Act and later in 1938 the RFD introduced their
first territorial conservation policies, securing forest reserves for future logging
operations (Sato, 2000, p. 161). Land ownership and forests became further delineated in
1941, with the Forest Act, defining forests as ‘all land that does not belong to any
individual based on the land law' (p. 160).
Post world II Thailand rapidly expanded the RFD and integrated the forestry goals
and practices of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. This included an even more
intensive extraction of their teak Forests and resulting in the doubling of the size of the
RFD in the late 1940s (Vandergeest & Peluso, 2006, p. 377). When the Thai government
increased their involvement in forest management, traditional upland swidden
agricultural practices came under scrutiny. The 1952 FAO Progress Report on Thailand
indicates that the FAO believed that local populations farming in the uplands, mostly
indigenous hill tribes, were not qualified to manage forests on a sustained yield basis.
Thus, they followed the increasingly global trend – in the name of so called better
forestry - to encouraged segregation between people and forests (pp. 377-379).
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“Sustained yield” forest management and global markets also began to conflict
with one another. Global markets prompted the expansion of rice and cash crop
cultivation, pushing agriculture into the forest frontier, while international environmental
movements prompted the creation of protected areas and the scientific regulation of
forests (Sato, 2000, p. 162). Although forest reservation began just after World War II,
the majority of the forest reserves were not designated until the 1960s and 1970s
(Vandergeest, 2003, p. 25). In the 1980s the RFD reacted with new zoning policies when
the failure of the demarcation policies of the 1960s and 70s became obvious. The areas
designated as forest reserves were now zoned based on different functions related to
different objectives and restrictions (Buergin, 2000, p. 10). Within this context, these
protected areas, including National Parks, Wildlife Sanctuaries, and Watershed Protection
Forest (Wittayapak, 2008, p. 122) were supposed to comprise more than a quarter of the
total land area “in which human settlement and forest use is to be prohibited and
resettlement enforced as far as possible” (Buergin, 2000, p. 10).
Decentralization
Decentralization in Thailand results in conflicting approaches from government
agencies and the mostly unrealized threat of eviction for the forest dwelling communities.
The recent decentralization of governmental authority in Thailand creates the possibility
of de facto rights for forest dwellers within forest reserves. The Tamboon Administration
Act of 1992, sought to delegate more jurisdiction to sub-district and district level
administrations. As a result of this act, in general, governance in Thailand is divided
between central, provincial, district, sub-district, and village level administrations. The
Ministries and Departments fall under the jurisdiction of the central government, with its
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elected officials and appointed ministry positions. The central government also appoints
provincial and district level officials. A district, however, is composed of at least two
sub-districts (tamboon) whose officials are locally elected for five year terms and
operated under the supervision of the district chief officers. At the smallest level, or
village (mooban) level, a village headman is elected for a five year term. Both the subdistrict and village headman positions are considered government officers and get a
monthly remuneration from the central government (Government of Thailand, pp. 1-15).
Unofficially, satellite villages exist beneath the village level, with their own elected
headman. These headmen, however, are not officially recognized by the Thai
government.
The 1997 constitution states that local people and organizations should have a role
in managing their natural resources (Prangtong, 1999). Within the “National Plan of
Decentralization Process” of 2000, the goals of decentralization were to provide a wider
margin of powers to local authorities for policy decision-making and their administration,
especially in terms of personnel and finance. The national plan seeks to ensure that local
decision making will be done with a minimum degree of control by the central
government, allowing the central government to shift its role from directly providing
services to a more regulatory and supporting agency. This is all with the intent to
improve the effectiveness of local administration with emphasis on transparency,
efficiency and public involvement in decision making and critiquing governmental
performance. (Government of Thailand, p. 6)
To further complicate things, central state level politics is rife with its own power
struggles. From 1947-1992 the country vacillated between military governance, coups,
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and popular protests. After several years of democracy another military coup led by the
People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) against the Thai Rak Thai party and its Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawarta (Thailand Country Profile) occurred in 2006. The military
junta drafted a new constitution and held general elections in 2007. The return to civilian
rule, however, has not been simple. The Thaksin Thai Rak Thai party was dismantled,
but the United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) party arose in support of
Thaksin and against the PAD and the People’s Power Party (PPP). Subsequently, since
2008 protests have erupted between the yellow-shirts (PAD and PPP) and the red-shirts
(UDD), resulting in violence, the disruption of the 2009 4th East Asian Summit and even
closures of government buildings and the Suvarnabhumi International Airport. Since
May 2010 there have no been any more large scale protests, but Prime Minster Abhisit
Vejiajiva’s hold on power remains tenuous (Timeline Thailand).
The Horizontal Powers of Decentralization: NGOs, University, Religious Institutions
In addition to the government’s decentralization policies, an unofficial layer of
power also exists in Thailand. This layer consists of international, national, and local
NGOs, academics, and networks. International environmental organizations placed
pressure on the Thai government in the late 1980s to conserve their forests (Sato, 2000, p.
162), while international development organizations have taken up the cause of the
marginalized hill tribe communities. National and local level NGOs often work together
with the sub-district level government, as is the case with Huai Lu Luang’s Mae Yao subdistrict. In some instances, as what happened with the village of Pang Daeng Nawk,
NGOs collaborate to ensure some level of social justice. Phongpaichit, (2000) argues
that NGOs have advantages over government officials, such as more readily gaining
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people’s trust due to their knowledge of the local situations and culture. He further states
that developing country governments tend to cooperate with NGOs to achieve
development objectives or their working targets..

Racialization and Marginalization of hill tribes
Upland Holistic Development Project (UHDP) was founded in 1997 as a nongovernment organization registered with the Department of Social Welfare in Thailand.
At first, UHDP worked primarily with agriculture and the Palaung ethnic people in
Thailand. However, since 2006 they have been working with the Lahu (the main
ethnicity of Huai Lu Lunag), Ahka, Kachin, and Karen groups as well. A report in 1996
indicated that the total population of the major groups of hill tribes in Thailand was about
790,369, which is about 1.3% of the total national population, with Karen at 402,095,
Lahu at 78,842, and Akha at 48,468 (Kumbunratana, 1996). Palaung people total about
15,000 within Thailand. The hill tribe groups in Thailand vary in origin, but the five
ethnic groups UHDP works with all have roots in Myanmar. The three groups in the Mae
Yao sub-district include Lahu, Akha, and Karen (Burma notes, personal communication,
2009) and the eight villages in Chiang Rai province established themselves in their
current locations before the lands were designated reserve forests (personal
communication, 2009).
The racialization and marginalization of ‘hill tribes’ raises concerns for the human
rights NGOs and places a challenge to the upland communities and their official
recognition of rights. According to Buergin (2000), “the term 'hill tribes' came into use in
the 1950s as a generic name for the various non-Tai groups living in the uplands of
northern and western Thailand (p. 6). Very soon, the term 'hill tribes' was identified with
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the negative stereotype of forest destroying, opium cultivating, dangerous alien
troublemakers.” These local communities represent a range of ethnicities from Thai to
Shan to the multitude of “hill tribe” groups in Thailand. Their political status is low, they
have no seats in parliament or other high levels of government and they have very little
representation at the lower levels of government (McCaskill and Kempe, 1997, p. 23).
The stereotyping of ‘hill tribe’ communities has created a strong hierarchy of rank
within the country. Wittayapak (2008), states that in Thailand “civilization and
modernity can be depicted from the lowest to the highest end of the spectrum as Chao
Khao (hill tribes), Chao Bannok (villagers or peasants), Chao Krung (city people), and
the Farang (Westerners). In terms of space, the order ranges from mountain forest, rural
areas, Bangkok, and the West respectively” (p. 114). Vandergeest (2003) takes this
concept a step further by arguing that reserve forests, land titles, community forests,
protected areas, swidden fields, and traditional territories are socially produced spaces,
impacting racialization and the naturalization of nonTai ethnic groups (p. 23).
‘Hill tribe’ communities are viewed as uncivilized in their forest dwelling
communities and policies and Thai government officials and Thai media have a tendency
to scapegoat them for the nation’s problems. Consequently, deforestation in Thailand is
frequently blamed on ‘hill tribe’ communities. The Thai government defines the “hill
tribe problem” as a series of political, social, and ecological threats that are responsible
for much of the deforestation in Thailand (Sato, 2000, p. 164). Vandergeest (2003)
further expands on this point by explaining that, “a focus on racialization directs our
attention to the stereotypical extremes in which hill tribes are often portrayed in
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government forums and popular media. Government officials portray them in terms of
the problems they pose – deforestation, opium cultivation, and security” (p.27).
Notwithstanding, the discourse portrayed does not always reflect the understood reality:
official statements frequently refer to the destructive activities of local
villagers, but the persistent absence of empirical data on villagers' actual
forest use suggests that the state may not perceive villagers as serious
threats at all, but uses them to deflect public attention away from
corruption, large-scale infrastructure development, and illegal logging by
public officials themselves (Sato, 2000, pp. 164-165).
Regardless of the differences between the perceptions and the discourse, the reality is that
this dialogue further marginalizes ethnic, upland ‘hill tribe’ communities.
Upland ‘hill tribe’ communities have undertaken to secure more land use rights
through community forestry and by aligning their unofficially recognized community
forests with the policies of the pending community forestry bill currently in Parliament.
Around the time of the logging ban, rapid deforestation catalyzed NGOs, academics, and
local organization to explore community forestry. At the end of the 1980s these groups
began to argue for the local control of local resources through community forests as an
alternative to the forest conservation strategy of the RFD (Buergin, 2000, p. 11). All
unclaimed land legally became state property and increasingly incorporated into national
parks and wildlife sanctuaries due to the lack of legal recourse available to forest dwellers
and the ambiguity of property relations (Sato, 2000, p. 161).
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Deforestation and Conservation attempts in Thailand
Between 1961 and 2005 forest cover in Thailand decreased from 53.3% to 28.4 %
(World Bank, 2007). Wittayapak (2008) notes that, “Thailand has had one of the highest
rates of forest decline in Southeast Asia and the Thai government is pressured to retain
the remaining forests of the kingdom” (p. 122). Encouraged by the FAO, the National
Forest Policy strives to maintain the countries forest cover at 40%, with 25% designated
as protected forest and 15% as economic forest. However, growing public concern over
the rapidly dwindling forest resources pushed the Thai government to implement a nation
wide logging ban in 1989 (Vandergeest & Peluso, 2006, pp. 377-379; Johnson & Forsyth,
2002, pp. 10-11). This shift in forestry policy from management primarily for timber
production and harvest to conservation relied on stringent separation of people from
forests and has resulted in a mismatch between official land classification and actual land
use (Walker, 2003, p. 2). This disparity conflicts with the traditional swidden agriculture
and non-timber forest product harvesting practices of the roughly six million hill tribe
peoples of Southeast Asia who live within the boundaries of protected areas. Despite the
ban, illegal logging continues. Forests are converted for mining, plantation development,
local agriculture and impacted by population growth and poor land use practices
(Bandenoch 2006).
The logging ban, the growing area of land designated as reserve forest, and legal
discrepancies over land tenure have increased the number of conflict between people
and forest (Hares, 2009, p. 382). In Thailand, the management of forests and property
rights rests on a historical mix of traditional and legal ownership systems. Prior to 1900,
the King owned all the land in Thailand, providing grants to nobles and officials.
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However, beginning in 1901 and further established through the 1954 land law, he passed
laws that allowed formal land titles to be acquired. The cadastral surveys mentioned
previously opened up the possibility for land ownership through a title deed (chanod
tidin) that granted unrestricted ownership rights. Prior to a chanod tidin, levels of
resource use include a temporary occupancy permit (bai chong), an exploitation
testimonial (nor sor) after 75% of the land has been cultivated, and a special occupancy
permit (sor Kor) unless the land is a permanent reserved forest for settlers on the land,
like many of the upland hill tribes. However, much of the land in Thailand is still under
state ownership and accessible to local communities via de facto rights (Sato, 2000, p.
162). Therefore, for communities established within National Reserve Forests, nationally
unofficial, but locally recognized de facto rights can exist (ICEM 2003).
In 1991, an estimated 20% of the 56,000 villages in Thailand were located within
forest reserves (Bunga & Rambaldi, 2001). A detailed survey undertaken by the
Department of Land Development in Chiang Mai Province of 1,400 upland communities,
around this time found that 90 percent were located within forest reserves. Walker and
Farrelly (2008) note that “what this means is that there are vast numbers of rural residents
whose occupation and agricultural activity is, in the starkest terms, illegal” (p. 377).” By
2000, the Royal Forestry Department (RFD) expanded 13 national parks, resulting in the
relocation of over 200 communities (Srimongkontip 2000). Current national forest policy
makes it technically illegal for villages within reserve forests and around national parks
to have any resource rights, including hunting, logging, gathering non-timber products,
fishing, or practicing swidden agriculture (Tomforde, 2001), although locally and in
practice access rights may be allowed.
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People vs. Forests and relocation.
The notion that forests and people cannot co-exist implies that forest dwellers
must be evicted in order to protect forested areas. Holders of this position argue that
deforestation is caused by population increases and by illegal forest encroachment for
farming and activities like shifting cultivation (Walker & Farrley 2008, p. 377). Due to
the illegality of residing within forest reserves, most upland villages live under the threat
of eviction, a threat which is occasionally realized.
Pang Daeng Nawk village, in Chiang Dao district, Chiang Mai province is one
such example. Combined forces of RFD, local police, Border Patrol Police, and Special
Task Armed Forces raided the village on July 23, 2004, arresting 48 villagers for
violating forest laws. The villagers, mostly ethnic Palaung, migrated across the border
from Burma, escaping the repression and insurgent violence within the country.
Wittayapak (2008) points out, however, that “what is distinctive about this village is that
it has been raided and villagers arrested three times previously since 1989. The second
time was in 1998. They are the people without ID cards showing Thai citizenship” (p.
125). Without citizenship, these people have little legal recourse and are an easy target
for harassment. Since the time of Wittayapak’s article, more villagers have been arrested
and the entire village forcibly relocated. Subsequently, several national and international
NGOs and foundations secured nearby land for the village, and they are currently
rebuilding their community and are in the process of securing land ownership through the
names of the few community members who have Thai citizenship (Burnette, personal
communication, 2008).
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Some researchers argue, however, that the case of Pang Daeng Nawk is an
isolated incident, representing a mere fraction of the total number of communities facing
the threat of eviction. Peluso and Vangergeest (2011) suggest that “the relocation of
people into and out of these forest areas through resettlement, evictions, and
consolidations of settlements, with specific practices frequently based on racialized
understandings of loyalty to the nation-state” (p. 595). However, during the late 1980s
and 1990s, the shear number of villages residing within designated forests precluded
comprehensive relocation efforts. Not only were the numbers too large, but the lack of
arable land in forests not designated for conservation kept most upland forest dwelling
communities on their land (Walker & Farrley, 2008, p. 388). Additionally,
decentralization within the government created conflicting approaches among various
government agencies with different forms of documentation provided to farmers to attest
to their right to use the land. Walker and Farrley (2008) write “while the RFD may often
have expressed a hard-line attitude toward residents of conservation forest zones, other
government agencies have been active in extending health, welfare, and local economic
development services to those same residents” (p. 389). The Thai government simply
does not have the capacity to mount a region-wide campaign against highland settlements
(p. 390). Regardless, “the threat of eviction remains a potent source of insecurity in the
uplands: More frightening than actual incidents, perhaps, are these frequent rumors which
spread [across] the hills of impending relocations, since these are almost certainly
deliberately instigated and serve to create a constant atmosphere of terror and uncertainty
about livelihood and tenure security” (p. 379). The threat of eviction haunts discussions
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of forestry management in northern Thailand and the forest dwelling communities,
themselves.
Forest Tenure Reform in Thailand
The RFD wrote first official draft of the community forestry bill in 1990 to
address the issue of forest tenure reform. According to Johnson and Forsyth (2002),
development based NGOs, academics, and grassroots organization criticized this version
for “effectively maintaining the discussion of forest management as purely state led” (p.
14). Buergin (2000) writes that,
NGOs established in local conflicts to support the interests of Tai farmers
against 'hill tribe' groups and 'dark-green', conservation oriented NGOs
now tried to push through their interests on a national level and found their
'natural' ally in the RFD with its protected area strategy. The new General
Director of the RFD, at the beginning of his period of office, already had
made clear, that for him a co-existence of people and forests was
unthinkable (p. 12).
From this point, a back and forth process began with the community forest bill. In
response to the RFD version, a coalition of activists and development NGOs drafted the
first “people’s” version asserting the rights of local villages to enter and use forests
(Johnson & Forsyth, 2002, p. 14).
Despite campaigning from both the RFD and the representatives of the “people’s
version,” neither bill was ratified by parliament. In 1996 the government eventually
requested that the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) organize
and draft a new version of the Community Forestry Bill, including participants from
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government, NGOs, academics, and grassroots communities (Johnson & Forsyth, 2002,
p. 14; Wichawutipong, 2005, p. 102). Wichawuttipong (2005) indicates that the NESDB
version - although subsequently approved by the Parliament - remained controversial
among NGOs. The main issue was over permitting community forests within protected
forest areas, this led to the contingency that communities needed to prove their
establishment prior to 1993 (using large scale aerial photographs as evidence) and show
their ability to protect forests (p. 102). However, regardless of these efforts, opposition
and a change in government stalled the passing of the 1996 “compromise” bill. Once
again the separate groups drafted separate bills. The 1999 RFD version contained
provisions allowing community forests within protected areas only with strict
prohibitions on use, it permitted plantations in community forests, and designated
primary management functions to national and provincial level governments
(Vandergeest, 2003, p. 29). This version also proposed that a ‘community’ must
comprise at least 50 individuals living in proximity to a forest, regardless of how long
they resided there or how they used the forest. In contrast, the ‘people’s’ version defined
a community as “a social group living in the same locality and having the same cultural
heritage, and who can apply for that status after a minimum of five years experience in
safeguarding forest land” (Johnson & Forsyth, 2002, p. 15).
Unfortunately, even for groups arguing and preparing for the “people’s version,”
the reality of the situation has been lost in the murky, elongated debate. As
Walker (2007), asks in reference to the issues addressed in the Community forest bill:
But what is the status of agricultural land within the proposed community
forest framework? This is a crucially important question given that …
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there are large areas of agricultural land located within forest reserve areas
on which tenure rights are ill defined and uncertain. What will the
proposed community forest legislation do to enhance the security of
farmers working these ambiguous lands? What sort of land use does the
community forest bill seek to endorse and facilitate?
The community forestry movement in Thailand seeks to address the need for village
rights to live in the forest and to use forest products as a prerequisite for improved
livelihoods. Community forestry advocates stress the conservation-friendly practices of
the upland hill tribes communities (Fisher and Hirsch 2008). The discourse becomes
watered down when advocates for community forestry stress the pro-poor,
environmentally friendly benefits, but fail to address bigger concerns of farming for these
upland communities (Walker 2003). Walker (2003) coins the term ‘arboreilisation’ to
refer to the limited view of agriculture having a legitimate place within forests. The view
that agriculture cannot exist within the forests, counters the tradition of swidden
agriculture, held by many of these upland hill tribe communities (Walker 2003,
Ganjanap, 1998). Peluso and Vandergeest (2011) refer to this as “taking the jungle out
of the forest,” referring to the criminalization of agriculture in forested area and the
discursive strategies of designating certain areas for settlement and certain areas for
permanent agriculture (p. 595).
The Thai government has implemented a policy separating people from forests, neither
allowing agriculture or forest access. Official policy becomes entangled through
government decentralization, and allowing some communities de facto use of land within
forest reserves through sub-district level recognition of customary rights. Thai policies
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tainted from racialization and polarized through the community forest bill, local
communities affected by the tenuous forest issues, such as Huai Lu Luang, must rely on
building their own grassroots level capacity and adaptability.
A chonod chumchon (community land deed) is another alternative to the
community forestry bill. Community land title deeds were approved by Prime Minister
Abhisit Vejjajiva’s Cabinet in June of 2010. The objectives are to improve soil quality
and provide land to poor farmers through the creation of land banks and the issuance of
land rights certificates for communities living on state land. By October of 2010, 89
requests for community deeds had been filed, covering over 10,000 rai (3954) in land.
The program offers land use documents to communities as part of the central
government’s broader strategy to help reduce income disparities within Thai society. As
part of being approved for a community land deed, a community must establish an
individual person to hold the deed and if the community fails to meet its legal obligations
the deed will be returned to the government. Chudrisi (2010) suggests that Mr. Sathit of
the community land deed screening committee would give priority to communities that
demonstrated a good land use plan with strong internal community controls and
demonstrated commitment in caring for natural resources.

Chapter 3: Methods
Study Site
This study focuses on Huai Lu Luang village in Mae Yao sub-district, Muang
district, Chiang Rai province, Thailand. The village is located within a national forest
reserve, alongside the Mae Kok River which the Royal Forestry Department is in the
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process of turning into the Mae Kok Basin National Park. Four districts and 13 subdistricts reside in the area proposed as a national park. In Mae Yao sub-district alone,
there are 13,000 people and 18 villages. Huai Lu Luang has no official land or access
rights to their current land or resources. All of the land they use is owned by the Thai
government, but they have de facto use of the land and forests. The village (see Map 1)
has roughly 410 people, 90 households, 95% of whom are Black Lahu and the remaining
5% are ethnic Yellow Lahu or Ahka. The villagers farm rice in paddy fields and rice and
corn in upland fields and have an average annual per capita income of 9000 baht ($250)
(UHDP Floresta Report) (see table 1) (see picture 1, 2, 3).
Picture 1: Huai Lu Luang Village

Picture 2: Huai Lu Luang Paddy Fields

Table 1. Huai Lu Luang Village Profile
*Taken from Floresta Report
Coordinates
Ethnicity
Approximate population
Households
Average income / year
Primary Crops
Primary sources of income
Farming landscape

(29.03652 N, 99.59476 E)
Yellow Lahu, Ahka, and
5% Black Lahu
410 (407 if no infants.)
90
9000 baht ($250)
Rice
Agriculture
Upland and paddy fields.
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Access to education
Nearest paved road

School through grade 9. 4
km away.
20km

Map 1. UHDP Target Villages in Northern Thailand

Residents of Huai Lu Luang have moved repeatedly over the years. Three
generations ago in the 1940s1 village ancestors lived in Southern China where relatives
still reside. Due to religious persecution, the communist government demanding up to
80% of their crops, and forced labor, many Yellow and Black Lahu moved from southern
China to Kengtung in the Shan Province of Myanmar in the 1940s (Village Pastor,
personal communication, October 18, 2010). In the 1960s the military junta took power
in Myanmar, restricting villager’s religious freedom and forcing some into labor camps.
The Black and Yellow Lahu then migrated from Myanmar and created the village of
Obsuawan (see Map 1) in Mae Yao sub-district in Thailand. Forty-eight years ago,
predominantly Yellow Lahu villagers from Obsuawan settled in the village of
1

All dates referenced regarding the migratory history and establishment of Huai Lu Luang result from an
oral history and have a standard deviation of at least a year.
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Panasawan. Around 1973, twelve Black Lahu families separated from Panasawan and
established Huai Lu Luang. A large influx of immigrants from Myanmar between 1974
and 2006 increased the population of the village from 30 in 1977 to 90 in 2010.
The majority of households in Huai Lu Luang have rice paddy fields and the few
that do not either share or rent fields from their neighbors, and all households have
upland fields and access to a shared community forest (Village Pastor, personal
communication, October 18, 2010). All of the land utilized by the village is government
owned land, but the local government allows the villagers de facto use of it and the RFD
has determined the area of allowed usage. The lack of land available to farmers precludes
their use of swidden agriculture which they had historically practiced in China and
Myanmar where they cultivated fields for three years and then fallowed fields for one to
two years (UHDP Floresta Report).
The community forest in Haui Lu Luang provides a “subsidy from nature” for the
villagers, supplementing household consumption needs and in some cases providing a
minor source of income. The de facto community forest encompasses 3570 rai (571.2
ha) and provides a place for villages to collect firewood, vegetables, medicine, timber,
and graze cattle and water buffalo (up to 4 cattle per household; Personal
Communication, October 2010). The forest is divided into three sections with specific
uses: watershed, land use, and cattle grazing (see Map 2). All three sections are managed
by the village’s community forest committee, established in 1977. This paper addresses
the lack of formalized forest use and access rights for Huai Lu Luang.
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Map 2. Huai Lu Luang Community Forest

Methodology:
This inquiry is a case study that is imbedded within broader socio-economic,
political, historical, cultural, religious, and legal contexts. Case studies, according to
scholar Robert Yin are “an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and
context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”
(1984, p. 23).” I coded and analyzed survey interviews, discussions with key informants,
participant observation, and group interviews in an attempt understand reality, where
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“reality itself is dependent on what people say and think” (Godfry- Smith 2003, pp. 181,
234).
In this sense, case studies hold the power to suggest implications for actions that
are realistic (Perry, 1998, p. 785; Yin, 1984, pp. 122-123). Although case studies can
have short comings in their capacity to make broader generalizations (Johansson, 2003, p.
8; Dillon and Reid 2004, pp. 28; Yin, 1984, p. 21), my study has potential applicability
for neighboring communities. It is intended to support efforts by Huai Lu Luang
villagers to secure formal land tenure rights, specifically through their chanod chumchon
proposal, and in that personal bias was noted before the study began and midigated
through transparent methods. This study will include an outline of the Huai Lu Luang’s
history and an evaluation of their community forest management and use practices as it
relates to Elinor Ostrom’s common pool resource governing principles.

Data Collection
Data collection methods included reorganizing old notes and summarizing
analyzed data collected between January 2007 and July 2009, including notes, emails,
journals, memos, reports, and interviews.

A literature review of the relevant topics of

land tenure and property rights, decentralization, racialization, forestry policy, policy
toward hill tribes, community forestry, and Lahu people in Thailand grounded the
analysis of field research in historical, political, and cultural contexts.
The study took place between September 21 and October 31, 2010 and included
interviews with key informants, participant observation, survey interviews, and group
interviews. As a participant observer I attended meetings and trainings in villages
regarding community forestry and mapping. In addition, I worked with UHDP Lahu staff
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members for 20 months between January 2007 to July 2009 and from October 18 to 31,
2010 and lived in Huai Lu Luang, taking meals, drinking tea, and socializing with
villagers.
In September 2010 I interviewed key informants Ajan Jamlong, Ajan Tui, Huai
Lu Luang’s Pastor, and held two group interviews with the community forest committee
to better understand the context of the village and to guide my survey questions. These
interviews usually lasted between one to two hours. I then conducted survey interviews
with 32 individuals (see Appendix B for survey questions) and conducted follow-up
interviews with the community forestry committee, village headman, and Ajan Jamlong
to respond to unanswered questions with the assistance of a native Lahu speaker (see
Appendix A, table 1). Every interview was tape recorded and Warunee Harichaikul
(Mint) translated the interviews from Kha Muang (Northern Thai dialect) or Black Lahu
to English.
The 32 survey interviewees were selected through a purposive sampling method,
a type of nonprobablity sampling where I ascertained which units should be observed
based on my judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative
(Babbie, 2007, p. 193). Ostrom’s (2002) framework does not address minority groups in
her attributes for successful common pool resource management; however, I selected the
sub-groups of gender, ethnicity, and age because I wanted to gain an unbiased,
comprehensive picture of the whole village. Of my projected total of 30 interviews I
sought 15 female and 15 male interviewees and 10 each from the following age groups:
19 – 34, 35-49, and 50 and above. For each of those age groups I made sure I had five
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women and five men. In addition, I interviewed two Akha and Yellow Lahu peoples to
assess possible ethnic differences in the village (see table 3).

Table 3: Number of Interviews by group
Male Female
Age Group A (19-34) 5
5
Age Group B (35-49) 7
5
*1 male Yellw Lahu

Age Group C (50 + )

5

5

*1 male Ahka

Of the 32 interviews, six were found by my translator (four females, two males),
five were recommended from other interviewees (three females, two males), six were
provided through the village wide speaker announcement (four females, one male), and
15 were provided by community forestry committee members (two females, twelve
males) [see appendix A, table 2]. The survey questions were drafted to specifically
address Ostrom’s (2002) framework of attributes of resources and resource users that she
found affect a communities ability to self-govern common-pool resources.

Data Analysis
The data were analyzed against Ostrom’s (2002) framework, with additional
context driven information provided through key informants, group interviews,
participant observation, published literature, and a review of government regulations and
policies. The data was coded as it was collected, with written memos after each day of
interviewing. Through the coding process, I drew out different themed answers for each
survey question and then compared them against the broader attributes of Ostrom’s
guidelines that the questions were designed to answer. I used pivot tables on Excel to
provide a quantitative, percentage based, analysis of responses to assess how Huai Lu
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Luang’s experience with their community forest compared with Ostrom’s criteria.
Through the coding process answers to the 42 questions were simplified into categorized
replies allowing each question to be assessed on the basis of what percentage of
respondents thought “x.”

The pivot tables also allowed me to see the most frequently

referenced themes (see Appendix B). I further used pivot table to discern different
themes based on gender, age, and ethnicity, an when present those were included in the
results. The data collected and the participant observer experiences were scored on a
five-point scale: very strong, strong, moderate, weak, and very weak, with the rational for
each rating explained below each attribute in the results. This scale was derived to
provide a rating of Huai Lu Luang ‘s behavior with Ostrom’s (2002) framework. Very
Strong indicted that Huai Lu Luang 100% matched Ostrom’s attribute. Strong meant that
Huai Lu Luang demonstrated a full capacity for Ostrom’s attribute, but that there is still
room for improvement. Moderate meant that Huai Lu Luang had the framework of the
attribute and in some ways met it but enforcement or application of it was not met. Weak
meant that Huai Lu Luang only had the skeleton capacity to meat Ostrom’s attribute, and
very weak meant that Huai Lu Luang did not show any capacity to meat Ostrom’s
attribute. Each of these ratings were assigned on the basis of survey interview responses,
group interviews, key informant interviews, and participant observation. .

Chapter 4: Results and Discussion
Huai Lu Luang was founded in 1973 and its community forest established in
1977. A representative from each of the 30 families present in Huai Lu Luang in 1977
voted unanimously to accept the community forest, its committee, and its rules.
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According to the community forest committee the community forest was established
because,
In those days, before the community forest, everybody do what is right in
their own eyes concerning the forest. It’s a must to have a committee.
Before, outsiders like Thai people local people cut the tree also, and we
have no authority to stop them, because they don’t have the committee.
And another thing is we want to permanently establish here and not
migrate to anywhere else. So we have a meeting and villagers agree with
this and set up a committee and the community forest. (personal
communication, October 2010).
The committee itself is made up of 13 Black Lahu volunteer men broken up into the roles
of president, vice president, secretary and treasurer. Women are not allowed on the
committee or in any leadership role in Huai Lu Luang, but ethnic minorities are accepted.
(Community forest committee, personal communication, October 2010). The community
forest governance rules, however, were first suggested by the Royal Forestry Department.
The community forest committee then agreed on them before they were submitted to the
rest of the village for approval (Community Forest Committee, personal communication,
October 28, 2010). Since the establishment of the community forest, the village, NGOs,
and the government have undergone various efforts to resolve the issue of people living
in the forest, as explained below. For example, in 1990, the government supplied the
villages with teak tree saplings. Students from Chiang Mai visited Huai Lu Luang and
recommended that they dedicate a portion of the forest (not already designated as
community forest) to the king in order to prevent the government from taking the land
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away. In 1995, due to encouragement from these university students, the village set aside
an additional portion of 5,000 rai (1977 acres) for the king. A community forest
committee member explained:
You ask the monk to come and sprinkle water and say it is dedicated to the
spirit of the tree and the sun and the sky, and whoever wants to cut the
tree, let them be cursed. So, if a Buddhist, according to the Buddhist
religion, wants to cut or if they want to take away the land, they go against
their own religion. This is the reason why we do this ceremony and after
the ceremony that land is dedicated to the king. (personal communication,
October 18, 2010)
In 1999, Huai Lu Luang villagers joined the Bangkok protests over the
community forestry bill. During this time NGOs began to work with Huai Lu Luang
village. One of their first established relationships was with the Thai-Lahu Baptist
Convention, but later they established working relationships with the Mekong Minority
Foundation (MMF), Mirror Foundation, Compassion International, Community
Organizations Development Institute (CODI), a Rice Bank, and Upland Holistic
Development Project (UHDP). The Thai-Lahu Baptist Convention worked with projects
on health, AIDS, drugs, the environment, and the community forest. While MMF works
to improve soil and encourage backyard gardens, and UHDP furthered work with
community forestry.
UHDP began working with Huai Lu Luang in 2006, with the original goal to
build the networking and farming capacity of the villagers and to increase their
understanding of community forestry. The first year involved the establishment of

40

community forest networks between neighboring villages to discuss interactions with the
government. Through the network, UHPD also provided trainings in community forestry
and related laws. Those meetings provided a chance for neighboring villages to network
and update each other on the situations in their respective villages. During these
meetings villagers talked about the potential problem of the proposed national park and
encounters they had experienced with the RFD. In one incident the RFD offered 50,000
baht (US $ 1670) to villages under the pretense of preserving the forest and giving the
land to the RFD. One community forestry committee member described his experience
as this:
I also rejected and sensed that something wrong. The next morning the
officer come again and ask to give the land. And on another day the
officer said he wanted to negotiate with the villagers. That day I was not
around, and then all the villagers sign their signature. Why they sign is
because the government say “we give you 50,000 baht, this money is not
to buy the land but to help you save the forest.” When I found out the
villagers had signed I went down to the head quarter and told the officer
“it’s wrong for you to do that, to just ask some of the villagers to sign the
signature in order to approve that. You have to get the signature from the
headman all the through to the sub-district. The officer that gave the
money said he wouldn’t give money anymore. But it didn’t stop there, he
came one more time and tried to entice the headman. But I said “you
cannot do this, if you want to ask us to accept the money, you must tell all
of the villagers and ask them first whether they thinks its good and if they
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agree to sell the land or not. (Interviewee 13, Personal Communication,
October 20, 2010)
Although this villager helped Huai Lu Luang, that was not the case for other neighboring
villages. In Pansawan (see map 1), they received the 50,000 baht and lost the land they
had used as a community forest and ended up receiving a portion of forest from Huai Lu
Luang for use as a community forest (Interviewee 13, Personal Communication,
10.21.2010). In 2007 villagers expressed the desire to map their community forest
boundaries, which led to GPS training for UHDP staff and members of the network.
Officially, five community forests were mapped by members of their respective villages,
including Huai Lu Luang’s (see map 2). This mapping project delineated community
forest boundaries and helped resolve inter-village boundary disputes.
By 2008 the sub-district government stepped in to create more detailed maps
through the use of 1:4000 scale aerial photos with tracing paper overlaid. Each household
was then able to trace on the photo the outline of their rice paddies, house, and upland
fields. The hope is that by designating the land and creating official maps, villages will
have better negotiating tools with the RFD and be prepared whenever the Community
Forestry Bill passes in parliament. Some community members have suggested that this
process has been empowering. Ajan Tui, co-director of UHDP, noted that
P’Chatchai (a village member) has mentioned that the GIS/GPS training is
also very useful for them because it’s a case that the forestry dept and
another department relates to land title came to Panasawan. They
organized a meeting and told the villagers about a type of land title. They
said they could finish all the GIS/GPS data collection for the whole village
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within half day. P’Chatchai and other leaders curious about the possibility
because there are more than 150 plots in the villages, both farming and
housing areas. They were told to sign a paper but mentioned as for meals,
but the leaders suggested not sign it. P’Chatchai said that because of the
training, it helps us to understand more bout some technical process
(personal communication, 2.3.2010).
In December 2008 and January 2009 the conflict over forest usage came to a
crisis when the government began a serious drive to establish the national park. Step five
among the 13 steps that the RFD is required by national law to follow when establishing
a national park, the villages had to vote on January 15, 2009 about whether or not to
allow the national park in their area. On December 23, 2008 the villages held a meeting,
appointed two to three people from each village for a meeting on December 28th with the
tamboon. The group decided that they wanted to provide the following for that meeting:
1) draft a letter to the tamboon, with signatures from the village headman, expressing
their concern about the national park; 2) Bring a copy of the 13 steps the government
must follow to create a national park, pointing out that step three (where the RFD has to
seek permission from the villages about the boundaries) was omitted; 3) Bring meeting
minutes from December 23rd meeting; 4) bring the forms for the 1:4000 maps, detailing
the demographics of each village; and 5) provide an agenda for the meeting on the 28th
(Meeting, personal communication, 12.28.2009).
Through their efforts, on January 15th, 2009 the national park was voted down.
This forced the RFD to hold more formal communications with the tamboon and the
villages themselves. The current political turmoil in Bangkok has forced the RFD to
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slow down efforts to create a park, but not stalled them. They already finished building
an office for the national park and the staff is on site; they are simply waiting to officially
open the park. According to Ajan Jamlong “the participation of the villagers is very few,
even you think the way they do is ask your opinion ask you to vote, but that one is no
matter you vote okay or not they already set up the mind that they are going to do”
(personal communication, 9.21.2010).
While the RFD is going forward with national park plans, parliament is going
ahead with the chanod chumchon. In hopes of being the second pilot project, Huai Lu
Luang has created a land bank. The land bank includes 1) the community forest
committee, 2) a proposal for the chanod chumchon, 3) a budget, and 4) a land map. “The
purpose or objective to have land bank in community is not for you to sell to the outside,
but for villages to come and have this land, own this land.” (Ajan Jamlong, personal
communication, 9.21.2010). The establishment of the national park would alter the
livelihoods of the villagers. Villagers will not be able to build new homes or have access
to the forest. Any field left fallow would be reclassified as forested land, resulting in
immediate income loss, a significant reduction in future agricultural production and
reduced potential to development sustainable upland farming systems. Villagers would
have to purchase fruits, nuts, and vegetables and find a substitute for firewood, adding to
their expenditure (Ajan Jamlong, personal communication, 9.21.2010).
Huai Lu Luang created multiple committees when they were first established,
starting with the committee to select the location for the village, followed by the more
permanent religious, government, and community forest committees. The religious
committee works both with youth and adults. The government committee is split into
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two parts, one that serves as a representative to the government and the other which seeks
to understand the law. The mission of the community forestry committee is:
To live sufficiently, and for future generations to remember and practice
how the older generations looked after the forest. This will benefit
everyone, provide good air and people will still have permanent upland
and paddy fields to work and survive in this community. (Personal
communication, 10.28.2010).
Picture 3, 4: Center of Huai Lu Luang and Community Forest Rules

Posted in the village are the 10 official rules that the community forestry committee
choose and then the village voted on in 1977 (see pictures 3 and 4):
1. Do not light fire in the community forest. It will be a fine of 1500 baht.
2. Do not find bamboo shoot to sell for villagers and outsider.
3. Do not cut a tree from forest. It will be a fine of 3000 baht.
4. Do not extend your land into the community forest. It will be a fine of 2000 baht.
5. Within your own land if you want to burn the grass make sure you have done a
fire line for prevention.
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6. If there is a wild fire, everyone must help to put the fire out.
7. Before the hot and dry season, every family must cooperate to help make the fire
line.
8. Every villager has to take responsibility of looking after the community forests. If
there is something wrong, report it to the community forest committee
immediately.
9. Any family that needs a tree must ask for permission from the committee first.
10. If anyone breaks the rules 1-4 more then 3 times he will be given over to a
government officer to be dealt with according to the laws.
Currently, the villagers have reported that the community forest provides them
with 31 resources (see illustration 1): forest vegetable, hunting, bamboo shoot, house
wood, Mae Duu, fruit, fish, banana flower, mushroom, bamboo, food, firewood, fireline,
house bamboo, plow wood, construction bamboo, raise cattle, nut, everything, many
things, string bamboo, construction wood, bird, furniture bamboo, herbs, medicine, house
pole, construction wood, wood for rice bank, bees and honey, a place to visit, walking
path, and bamboo worm. Additional, the community forest provides the following 27
services, wildlife, clean water, healthy environment, village, unity, fire prevention, clean
air, green scenery, rest, cool air, water flow, family security, good health, water, forest
access, loans through the community forest committee, prevent global warming, flood
prevention, land security, forest for future generations, common use, a way to give back
to forest, a way to save money, replace resources, trees, peace, and unity with forest
(Survey interviews, personal communication, October 2010).
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Illustration 1: Community Forest Products

Caption: Starting in the upper right corner clockwise: Grill, Water Buffalo,
Construction Bamboo, Foods from the forest (rattan, cicada, bamboo, herbs), Bamboo
worm, furniture bamboo, pig pen. Center: House pole.
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Common-Pool Resource Framework
This section evaluates Huai Lu Luang’s design, use and management of their
community forest in light of Ostrom’s (2002) framework for common-pool resource
management. The analysis uses the five-point scale discussed earlier of very strong,
strong, moderate, weak, and very weak to assess each attribute.

Resource Attributes
Table 4: Ostrom’s (2002) Attributes of the resource summary of key Huai Lu
Luang villager responses and researcher ratings.
Question

Positive Negative No

Rating

Other Notes

Strong

Only 26 respondents old enough
to remember

Moderate

The Negative is that the CF
committee tries.

Answer
A1

A2

1. Do you think it is
better now or before the
forest was a community
forest? Why?
2. How else did you use
the forest?
3. What products did you
personally get from the
forest before it was a
Community Forest?
4. Is there anything in the
forest you used to have
access to that you wished
you had access to now?
5. How was knowledge
about the forest taught to
you and by whom?
6. Give one example of
something you learned
that you think is
important.
7. How do you think you
should use the forest to
keep it healthy?
8. How well informed do
you think the community
forest committee is about
managing the forest?
9. Since the forest has
been a community forest

100%

78%

16%

6%
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A3

A4

do you use the forest
more or less? Why?
10. Are there any
resources in the
community forest that
you worry are too scarce
to be used? Why?
11. Is there enough land
in the Community Forest
to meet your needs?

Strong

66%

19%

15%

Strong

10% of the positive respondents
answered yes, but they couldn’t
expand if they wanted to.

“R1. Feasible Improvement: Resource conditions are not at a point of deterioration such
that it is useless to organize or so underutilized that little advantage results from
organizing” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5)

In Huai Lu Luang: Strong. This attribute was evaluated on the basis of questions one to
four, from explanations given to other questions during the survey interviews, and from
participant observation of the community as compared against other forested areas in the
region. It was given a strong rating based on the apparent improvement, suggested by the
respondents, in the forest since it has been a community forest (see table 4). All 26 of
the interviewees old enough to remember a time before the established community forest
answered that they thought the forest was better now as a community forest, than before.
The reasons given included regulation of forest resources, responsibility allocation within
the village, land security, better forage for cattle, more green scenery, more NTFPs, better
village unity, and better education for the villagers about the forest. Fifteen of the
respondents (65%) listed regulation as the main reason why the forest it better now.
Interviewee 19 explained “Yes, better now, because before everybody just come into the
forest to find the food, even the outsider. The food becomes less and less. Now it is
better with the community forest” (personal communication, October 2010). Interviewee
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11 elaborate, “It’s better when they have the community forest. Because before they just
cut the tree down whenever, they don’t treasure or share it and they don’t know the value
of the forest” (personal communication, October 2010). Others explained the benefits of
having a committee to manage the community forest. “If nobody in charge to take care of
the forest, nobody will take care, so its good for them to have specific job descriptions”
(Interviewee 9, personal communication, October 2010). “To have is better for the
villagers. If you don’t have community forest then people just do what’s right in their
own eyes so no limitations on bad or good, so its not good, must have the committee to
control” (Interviewee 4, personal communication, October 2010)
A few villagers provided specific examples of changes they had observed in the
forest, particularly regarding the broom tree. Before the community forest was
established, one villager mentioned using the plant to make brooms (see picture 4). She
stated that broom trees grow only in full sun and that with the development of large trees
and heavy shade in the community forest she now gathers the plant in her upland field
(Interviewee 23, personal communication, October 2010). Another talked about how the
forest stays green now throughout the year and that springs and small streams now
provide year-round water flow, “In those days, when the CF hasn’t come yet, they cut the
tree down, so no water, so it gets dry, and they cannot do the paddy fields, but have to use
upland fields” (Interviewee 1, personal communication, October 2010). Seven other
interviewees mentioned water as a key resource that is provided by the community forest.
Pictures 5 and 6 illustrate the apparent good health of the current forest.
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Picture 5, 6 Right to Left, a view from below Huai Lu Luang’s community forest
looking up into the forest and a view within the community forest. Picture six shows
forest vegetables of rattan, black sugar palm, forest pepper, and fish tale palm
harvested by villagers on a regular basis. The pictures suggest the biodiversity ad
availability of forest species.

“R2: Indicators: Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the resource system are
frequently available at a relatively low cost” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5)

In Huai Lu Luang: Moderate. The rating for this attribute was evaluated on the basis of
questions five to nine, key informants of the village headman and Ajan Jamlong, and
interviewee 26. The moderate rating was given on the basis of the lack of clear data and criteria
used for monitoring the community forest (see table 4). The community forest committee
examines the community forest on weekly basis checking for signs of illegal use, the need for
plant replacement, and the overall condition of the forest. Seventy-eight percent of respondents
said that they thought the committee was well informed about the conditions and management
needs of the community forest, while 16% thought they at least put in a good effort. However,
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three villagers were concerned about the lack of clear information the committee had to monitor
the forest. Ajan Jamlong explained,
“Huai Lu Luang does not have the qualified person to help them. Even their children,
although they are educated, they no longer stay in the village, but live in the city. So this
is another problem. There is no qualified man or woman to take this task. Many times
they rely on UHDP staff work, but we are also full of work and sometimes are not be
able to help fully” (personal communication, 10.31.2010).
Without a record of previous past tree density and resident flora and fauna and without clear
guidelines regarding what to monitor or what makes for a healthy forest, some villagers
expressed uncertainty and concern about the condition and management of the forest by the
committee. As one villager explained
Get information to make a healthy forest. If they get the right information, then
those who have knowledge, those who have degrees can help. It’s better than to
just say verbally that “I look after the forest” but doing in action as well. If the
government come and investigate we can show them by the evidence from
changes year by year that have been looking after the community and it’s really
fruitful. I know the community forest committee go out into the forest and
monitor each week. It doesn’t mean that all the peoples do a bad job, they are
doing their best, but it’s such a waste for you to look after everyday 10 times in
vain without having right information and evidence. (Interviewee 26, personal
communication, October 2010)
Ajan Jamlong (personal communication) worries that if Huai Lu Luang remains too long in a
state of uncertainty with regard to the legal use and management of their community forest,
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valuable knowledge could be lost. He notes
But what will impact the villagers if the chanod chumchon takes too long is that
the next generation might not be able to follow. Even the old people now, it is
maybe about two generations already that they have not been able use
traditional forest practices, so the knowledge of the people is limited” (personal
communication, 10.31.2010).
The village headman explained how fresh air and the maturation of trees indicate a healthy
forest, but when pressed with more questions, none were able to provide specific metrics or
indicators of forest health (personal communication, October 29, 2010). Thus, while the
committee clearly attempts to monitor the forest, a general lack education and training on forest
health and the absence of specific metrics to monitor likely limits the value of monitoring
efforts.

“R3: Predictability: The flow of resource units is relatively predictable.” (Ostrom, 2002,
p. 5).

In Huai Lu Luang: Strong. This attribute was evaluated on the basis of interview question
ten, participant observation, and key informants. The rating of strong was given on the
basis of knowledge displayed by respondents on the resources they use from the
community forest (see table 4). Twelve villagers talked about collecting resources when
they were in season, including mushrooms, banana flowers, nuts, fruits, and wild
vegetables. The community forest committee described the harvests as,
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Each year we can have about three kinds of mushroom, each according to
their own season. The stream flow is also predictable. The nuts were last
month, and there’s one kind of vegetable we always have the whole year
inside the community forest. (personal communication, October 28, 2010)
In addition, for certain high demand products, such as the Mae Duu tree, the committee
decides when trees can be cut and shared with the entire village, with distribution based
on need.

“R4: Spatial Extent: The resource system is sufficiently small, given the transportation
and communication technology in use, that appropriators can develop accurate
knowledge of external boundaries and internal microenvironments.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5)

In Huai Lu Luang: Strong. This attribute was evaluated on the basis of question 11 and
participant observation in creating maps for Huai Lu Luang and the neighboring villages.
This attribute is given a strong rating based on respondent opinion and the restrictions
placed on the size of the community forest (see table 4). When asked “Is there enough
land in the Community Forest to meet your needs?”, 56% responded yes, 19% responded
no, 15% didn’t know, and 10% answered that there wasn’t the option of expanding. As
interviewee 29 explained “The size is just nice because what they have now everybody
can look after well. If it gets bigger than this with this the villagers may not be able to
look after it well” (personal communication, October 2010) Not all respondents agreed
with this, however. One individual argued that the community forest was not large
enough. “You cannot depend on the community forest the whole year, like right now
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what they have is not very perfect or healthy forest yet, all the villagers cannot rely
throughout the year. 365 days, cannot rely on the community forest yet, so not enough
land yet” (Interviewee 26, personal communication, October 2010).

Ultimately,

however, additional land is not available to expand the community forest due to presence
of neighboring villages and because of restrictions by the RFD.

Attributes of Resource Users

Table 5: Ostrom’s (2002) Attributes of the resource users summary of key Huai Lu
Luang villager responses and researcher ratings.

A1

Question

Positive

Negative

12. What products do
you personally get from
the Community Forest?
13. How many times
per week do you go
into the community
forest and what do you
do / get?
14. What are your
family’s main
expenses?
15. What is your main
source of income?
16. Since the forest has
been a community
forest do you get more
or less income from the
forest? Why?
17. What products does
your family use from
the Community Forest?
18. Do you think
managing the
community forest is
important? Why?
19. What are the
benefits to you or your
family for having
access to the
community forest?
20. What other services
does the Community

100%

0
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No
Answer
0

My
Rating
Very
Strong

Other Notes
All respondents mentioned multiple
products and services they get from
the comunity forest

A2

A3

A4

A5

A6

Forest provide?
21. What services do
you get from the
community forest that
you couldn’t afford to
pay for or wouldn’t
have access to
otherwise?
22. Do you feel that
everyone in the village
has a common
understanding of the
forest?
23. What is your
biggest concern about
the community forest?
24. How much income,
if any, do you get from
the community forest
each year?
25. Outside of the
community forest have
you planted any forest
products that you use?
What?
26. Do you ever go
outside the community
forest to collect forest
products? Where?
27. Do you trust the
other members of the
committee and village
to abide by the
community forest
rules?
28. How were you
involved in the process
that decided the
community forest and
the rules?
29. Do you even see
members from the
community forest
committee out in the
forest?
NA

100%

88%

Strong

3%

9%

Strong

100%

Strong

Moderate

Very
Strong
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32% of the positive respondents
answered “most”

“A1: Salience: Appropriators are dependant on the resource system for a major portion
of their livelihood.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).

In Huai Lu Luang: Very Strong. This attribute was assessed on the basis of questions 12
to 21 and given a strong rating due to respondent’s mention of the number and frequency
of resources utilized from the community forest (see table 5). Although asked, villagers
could not quantify the actual percentage of their annual livelihood that the community
forest provides, however, all 32 interviews expressed that it provided important
contributions Villagers listed forest vegetables, wood for building houses, mushrooms,
bamboo, food, firewood, herbs, banana flower, raising cattle, nuts, construction wood and
bamboo, water, string bamboo, medicine, land, and furniture as services they get from the
community forest that they couldn’t afford to pay for otherwise (see graph 1). Forty-one
percent of respondents listed timber products as a main resource the community forest
provides. One villager explained,
We use bamboo and wood to build the house. If they didn’t have the forest
they might have to spend money. For food also. Not only mushroom, not
only bamboo shoot, but also banana flower they can use for food. And the
community forest especially cuts down lots of expenses on medicine, they
can get the herbs from the forest. (Interviewee 2, personal communication,
October 2010).
Another villager explained “especially main thing I consider is food, if I didn’t have a
community forest, I would have to pay in order to get all the vegetables and herbs. Like
bamboo shoot, like mushroom, like many kinds of vegetable, fern” (Interviewee 11,
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personal communication, October 2010).

Additionally, “even the water also would be

dirty and soil also not good condition. And at the worst you have to relocate to another
place if you don’t have the forest” (Interviewee 16, personal communication, October
2010).

Twenty-two percent of respondents mentioned firewood as something they

retrieve from the community forest. One villager explained “change the wood for the
cooking fire to replace with gas stove, they need to buy gas stove because they cannot go
to the community forest to get the wood” (Interviewee 27, personal communication,
October 2010).
Challenges arose in discerning gender and age differences in resource use. When
asked “what products do you personally get from the community forest?” and “what
products does your family get from the community forest?”, the answers given were not
congruent with usage (see Table 6). Only one female mentioned using the forest more
than one to two times a year and yet all 15 women listed products that would require at
least monthly access into the community forest. The research questions were designed to
distinguish between the individual and the household. Respondents, however, answered
most questions according to household and not individuals. This is a limitation of this
particular survey. A better preface before the questions to explain what I was looking
for, may have avoided this confusion.
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Table 6: Products collected from the community forest by Huai Lu Luang villagers
by gender and age (n=32).
Total Female Male A* B C
Produce (forest vegetables, fruits, mushrooms, and

24

10

14

14

5

Meat (hunting, birds, and fish)

6

3

3

5

1

Raising Cattle

3

1

2

Timber products (firewood, construction wood, and

17

6

11

5

nuts)

6

2

1

9

2

bamboo)
*A= age group 18-34, B = age group 35-50, and C = 50+

Figure 1: Community forest resource units most frequently obtained by Huai Lu
Luang villagers (n=32).
Main Resources used from the Community Forest
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Water
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“A2: Common Understanding: Appropriators have a shared image of how the resource
system operates (attributes R1,2,3 and 4 above) and how their actions affect each other
and the resource system.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).

In Huai Lu Luang: Strong. This attribute was evaluated through interview questions 22
to 23 and given a strong rating based on the common understanding displayed from those
responses (see table 5). All 32 interviewees thought managing the community forest was
important, the majority explained that they thought this because of the division of
responsibilities, forest stewardship, and regulation the community forest committee
provides. When asked “do you feel that everyone in the village has a common
understanding of the forest?” 19 responded yes (10 women and 9 men), 9 responded most
people (4 women and 5 men), and 1 female responded no. Of those who responded most,
four answered that the majority have a shared understanding and those who do not still
have to follow the guidelines. Interviewee 25, however, commented on the gender
discrepancy, “Most of the guys understand, but not all of the woman. The woman have
less education and common understanding because the man is the head of the family. For
every house that has a man, when a meeting is called the man will go as the
representative” (personal communication, October 2010). Another female elaborated
“Maybe we all have common understanding. But the lady never has a chance to sit down
with the guys when they are talking about the forest, so we have no idea if they have
common understanding or not. It’s just the men verbally telling us” (Interviewee 4,
personal communication, October 2010). Additionally, the question “are there any
resources you worry are too scarce to be used?” helped assess the degree of common
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understanding. A number of shared concerns are evident: nine responded a concern
over the availability of the Mae Duu tree, six mentioned deforestation, 15 stated that the
government will take away the land, and two for future generations (see fig 2).

Figure 2: Main concerns about community forest resources by Huai Lu Luang
villagers (n=32).
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“A3: Low Discount Rate: Appropriators use a sufficiently low discount rate in relation to
future benefits to be achieved from the resource” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).

In Huai Lu Luang: Strong. This attribute was assessed through the use of questions 24 to
26 and from key informant interviews. It was given a strong rating because of the small
amount of resources extracted outside of the community forest in relation to those
utilized within and because interviewees mentioned future benefits, thereby indicating
that Huai Lu Luang villagers do not discount the importance of future benefits from the
community forest (see table 5). Eighty-one percent of the respondents answered “yes”
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they have planted forest products outside of the community forest and 55% answered that
they will go outside of the community forest and outside of the sites they have planted
products to collect forest products. Fifty-three percent of respondents had planted teak
and eucalyptus, provided by the RFD and NGOs. Seventy percent of respondents who
went outside the community forest to collect forest products went to hunt, an activity that
is restricted within the community forest. Respondents listed six different resources
(hunting, broom tree, fishing, bamboo worm, raise cattle, and bees) they get outside the
community forest, as compared to the 31 services they listed that they get from the
community forest.
Specific uses and products derived from the community forest have changed over
time. Before there was a community forest 59% of the forest products listed by
respondents were timber products, whereas now, with use of the Mae Duu tree restricted,
only 41% of the products used from the community forest are timber products. Some
villagers mentioned that before they would simply waste the products in the forest, “now
is better, before we don’t treasure the forest, just waste the wood and the forest products,
but now we know to be cautious” (Interviewee 23, personal communication, October
2010). Individuals mentioned wishing they had access to even more forest vegetables,
bamboo shoots, Mae Duu, hunting, and using chainsaws . “After the committee came in,
we cannot freely cut the bamboo shoot to sell and cannot use machine to cut the tree
down” (Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 2010).

One man said “I’m

afraid, though they say plant replacement what you cut down, the period of the growing
is too long, so it might not be enough for the next generation to be able use the forest.
Like this generation cut all the big tree down and have to wait for more” (Interviewee 13,
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personal communication, October 2010). However, when asked if there was anything in
the forest they used to have access to that they wished they had access to now, 50% of
respondents answered no (8 women and 7 men). One female noted that “before there was
a community forest we should have preserved more of the natural forest” (Interviewee 6,
personal communication, October 2010) and another concluded “It’s meant for our good,
not only our generation, our children’s and grandchildren’s generation will have good
atmosphere, always have wood and forest product to use in our home” (Interviewee 23,
personal communication, October 2010).

“A4: Trust and Reciprocity: Appropriators trust one another to keep promises and relate
to one another with reciprocity.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).

In Huai Lu Luang: Strong. This attribute was assessed through question 27 and through
the coding of other questions that carried relevance to this attribute and was given a
strong rating based on the degree of trust expressed by respondents (see table 5). When
asked if they trust the other members of the village to abide by the community forest
rules, all 30 people who answered that question said yes. As interviewee 8 stated “after
they established the community forest I could see the villagers becoming more unified.
Everybody have to come with the conclusion, follow the rules and anything concerning
the forest they have to agree with one another and even they cut the tree also agree and
replace the tree by planting another tree” (personal communication, October 2010).
During the interviews, seven interviewees provided the unsolicited response of unity as
an important byproduct of the community forest. Four women mentioned unity and three
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men. Four individuals in age group b were concerned about village unity, while just two
in age group A, and one in age group c.

“A5: Autonomy: Appropriators are able to determine access and harvesting rules without
external authorities countermanding them.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 5).

In Huai Lu Luang: Moderate. Key informant interviews with the community forest
committee and village headman and the interview questions 28 to 29 helped determine
the rating for this attribute. The moderate rating was given, because while in practice
Huai Lu Luang has been able to determine access and harvesting rules without external
authorities countermanding them, they have no form of tenure security for those practices
to continue (see table 5). Officially, Huai Lu Luang does not have any legal right to
determine their access and harvesting rules; however, the government has granted Huai
Lu Luang a de facto use of their community forests. The village headman explained
The forest department is the one that decided the land and set the
boundaries, saying like “here to here is for where you can do your paddy
field and upland field and here to here is for the community forest. The
Forest department say if you don’t go beyond the boundary that they
indicate, then they will not come and disturb, they will not come and ask
for any document that you own this land. (personal communication,
October 2010)
The process for the creation and monitoring of the community forest rules further
illustrates the ambiguous nature of Huai Lu Luang’s ability to self-govern. The RFD first
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provided all of the rules for the community forest, then the community forest committee
considered those rules. Once the community forest committee decided the rules were
good, they put them to the vote within the village. One representative from each of the
30 households in Huai Lu Luang in 1977 voted rule by rule for the ten rules. Officially, a
majority vote was all that was needed for the rules to be implemented, however the 30
household representatives voted unanimously to accept each of the rules. The ten rules
established in 1977 are the same ten rules in existence today (village headman and
community forest committee, personal communication, October 2010).
Since the community forest rules and boundaries are in accordance with the RFD,
there were only a few incidents where interviewees referred to negative interactions with
the RFD. For example, one respondent noted, “when I was young, I thought that in those
days I could use the machine to cut the tree down. I started to cut the tree, did not finish
even one tree and the government come and stop me. This was before the community
forest was officially set” (Interviewee 3, personal communication, October 2010). The
only other incident mentioned was a situation that occurred in September, 2010. The
bridge connecting Huai Lu Luang (see picture 7 and 8) to the main road was broken.
Picture 7 and 8: Bridge before and after repairs.
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The villagers took a large piece of wood, currently used for a table and brought it down to
fix the bridge. The government came and took away the piece of wood, telling the
villagers that they need to buy wood in town that has been pre-approved according to the
bridges engineers. Ajan Jamlong explained it as
They don’t have the right to use the natural resource 100%, they are just
temporary residents. In order to survive, the villagers cannot fulfill all the
laws and regulations. Sometimes the government just closes their eyes
and lets the villagers steal the natural resource, even though they belong to
the government. By rights, the government can just to restrict their use of
the forest. The government took the wood for the bridge because the
village doesn’t have the final authority for the use of the resource.
(personal communication, October 31, 2010)
In practice, Huai Lu Luang can self-govern their community forest, but the ultimate
power still lies with the state and the RFD and with current plans for the national park in
play, their self-governing abilities are even more tenuous then in the past.

“A6: Prior Organizational Experience and local leadership: Appropriators have learned at
least minimal skills of organization and leadership through participation in other local
associations or learning about ways that neighboring groups have organized.” (Ostrom,
2002, p.5).

In Huai Lu Luang: Very Strong. This attribute was assessed on the basis of key
informants and participate observation and given a very strong rating because the of fifty
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plus years of organizational experience of Huai Lu Luang community members (see table
5). Huai Lu Luang village is predominantly Baptist. Sixty of Seventy years ago a Karen
missionary, Jan Saw Dipaw, brought Christianity to Lahu villagers in China. After the
Karen missionary, the America missionaries Paul and Ellen Lewis continued the work
with the Lahu in Burma. As the village pastor explained “the one who makes God’s
Kingdom grow fast is Paul Lewis and Ellen, because they translated hymn and hymnals
from the bible and the old and new testament” (personal communication, October 2010).
This holds relevance to this attribute because of the organizational tradition of the
Baptists in Southeast Asia. In Myanmar, there is the locally governed Myanmar Baptist
Convention with sub-branches like the Lahu Baptist Convention, these conventions are
then broken into smaller and smaller committees (Myanmar Baptist Convention
members, personal communication, March 2009). The organizational traditions gained
here continued when the first Lahu in-migrated from Myanmar to Obsuawan, then moved
from Obsuawan to Panasawan, and from Panasawan to Huai Lu Luang.

When the

village was established in 1973 the community organized a committee to plan for the
move from Panasawn to Huai Lu Luang. Once the village was established, they
subsequently formed the five committees discussed previously, which included
developing the community forest committee. The biggest limitation to their
organizational capacity is the lack of women in leadership. Ostrom does not address
gender in her framework, therefore this factor does not contribute to the rating for this
attribute. However, Huai Lu Luang is omitting a valid perspective and experience by not
allowing women to participate in leadership. Overall, the prior experience of the elders
in Huai Lu Luang with the Myanmar Baptist Convention and the organizational
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experience with the other committees in Huai Lu Luang illustrate that they have
substantial prior organizational experience.

Design Principles

Table 7: Ostrom’s (2002) Common-pool resource design principles summary of
key Huai Lu Luang villager responses and researcher ratings.

1

2a,b

3

4

Question

Positive

Negative

30. Do you understand where the
boundaries are for the community
forest?

75%

19%

31. Do you know where the
borders are for the different
sections of the community forest?
32. How familiar are you with the
community forest rules?
33. Do you agree with the
community forest rules?
33. Do you agree with the
community forest rules?
34. Are there any rules you think
should be added?
35. Are there any rules you think
should be taken away?
36. Who in the village do you
think used the community forest
the most? Why?
37. If you have a problem or
concern with the community
forest do you know who you can
talk to? Have you ever?
38. Have you ever broken a rule
before and not been caught?
40. Have you ever seen anyone
break a rule before?

47%

47%

93%

7%

5

NA

6

41. Have you had conflicts in the
village before, about anything?
How were these conflicts solved?
42. Do you think that having an

7

No
Answer
6% parts

My
Rating
Strong

6% parts

Other Notes
The majority of those
who didn’t understand
where the boundaries
were use the forest less
than three times a
year.

a, Strong
b, Strong

81%

19%

Strong

97%

3%

Moderate

Moderate
84%

16%

Very
Strong
Moderate
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The 1 respondent who
had broken a rule and
witnessed rule
breaking is a
community forest
committee member.

official community forest with
rules and regulations will help
your village to keep the
community forest and not have the
government take it away?
43. Have you ever encountered a
problem with the government over
using the community forest?

“1. Clearly Defined Boundaries: Individuals or households with rights to withdraw
resource units from the common-pool resource and the boundaries of the common-pool
resource itself are clearly defined.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).

In Huai Lu Luang: Strong. This principles was evaluated through participant observation
and interview questions 30 to 31. The rating of strong was given based on demarked
boundaries of the community forest and its divisions and because the majority of regular
users of the community forest understand where those boundaries exist (see table 7). Fire
lines and paths demark the external boundary of the community forest and streams and
colored markers distinguishing the internal boundaries (community forest committee,
personal communication, April 2007 and October 2010). Seventy five percent of
villagers responded that they understand and can locate the boundaries for the community
forest. Nineteen percent said that they did not understand the boundaries; however, all of
those respondents used the community forest less than two to three times per year. For
the internal divisions of cattle grazing, conservation, and forest usage areas within the
community forest, 47% responded that they understood the location of those divisions,
47% answered that they didn’t know, and 6 % said that they only knew were parts of
those divisions were. Among the 17 respondents who accessed the forest at least
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monthly, all stated that they clearly understand the external and internal boundaries of the
community forest.
Gender differences are evident in villager’s understanding of community forest
boundaries. All 17 men questioned stated that they understood precisely where the
external boundaries of the community forest were, while just seven women indicated that
they knew the boundaries, two indicated that they were familiar with some of the
boundaries and six stated that they did not know the boundaries at all. Of the respondents
then asked if they understood the internal boundaries, 12 men answered yes, four said no
and one answered in part. Among women, only three reported knowing the international
boundaries, 11 said they did not and one answered parts. Although this has the potential
to affect the rating on this attribute, use of the community forest by women is low. Only
one female answered that she used the forest at least monthly (see figure 4), while 12
answered that they use it semi-annually or less and two answered that they never use the
community forest at all. Among the men, 13 reported using the community forest
monthly or more, while only four accessed it semi-annually or less. The one female who
used the forest weekly noted that she understood the boundaries of the community forest,
although she did not understand the boundaries for the sections.
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Figure 4: Frequency of use of community forest by Huai Lu Luang villagers by
gender (n=32).
Gender usage of the community forest
30
25
20
Women

15

Men

10
5
0
weekly

monthly

bi-anually

anually

seldom

never

“2. Congruence: a) The distribution of benefits from appropriation rules is roughly
proportionate to the cost imposed by provision rules. b) Appropriation rules restricting
time, place, technology and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions.”
(Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).

In Huai Lu Luang: a) Strong b) Strong. This principle was evaluated on the basis of
questions 32 to 33 and through key informant interviews and participant observation.
Part A was given the rating of strong due to the unanimous agreement by the village over
the community forest rules and the support the interviewees showed for the community
forest as a whole. Part B was given a hesitant rating of strong because of the externally
provided rules and because of the lack of clear information provided about the level of
local knowledge of the forest (see table 7).
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Part A questions how the participants view of benefits of the community forest as
compared to the costs imposed by regulation. For Huai Lu Luang the costs of regulation
include the time of the community forest committee, the time spent creating the fire line
twice a year, and the cost of feeding the household volunteers who help make the fire line
(interviews, personal communication, October 2010). Additional ‘costs’ include the
restriction on access to resources like hunting, selling forest products in the market, and
the Mae Du tree (Village Headman and Ajan Jamlong, personal communication, October
2010). However, as previously mentioned in A1 (Salience), Huai Lu Luang is highly
dependent on the community forest and derives may timber and non-timber related
products from the forest that supplement their livelihoods. For example, on interviewee
explained “We can access the community forest and we don’t need to use money to buy
the products of the forest” (Interviewee 25, personal communication, October 2010). An
additional way that some of the financial costs of the community forest are mitigated is
through a bank the committee operates. As one individual described it, “we can borrow
money from the community forest. When they created the community forest, they have a
fund, so if anybody need cash they can go and borrow, but they have to pay interest”
(Interviewee 1, personal communication, October 2010). Through the interest paid on
the loans, and the fees collected from fines, the community forest committee does have a
small pool of funding available to cover the cost of maintaining the fire line.
Less information for part B of this attribute was discovered. As mentioned in A5,
the village was involved in the rule selection process, but those rules were provided by
the RFD. Within the scope of this research, it is unknown the level of local knowledge
the RFD has for the location of Huai Lu Luang. Additionally, the rules haven’t changed
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since they were created 33 years ago (village headman, personal communication, October
2010). The static nature of the rules, however, does not necessarily indicate irrelevancy.
All of the villagers think that managing the community forest is important and 93% agree
with the rules (see table 9). For example, rules 1,5,6, and 7 all address the place of the
community forest, by addressing fire. During the hot and dry season months (February –
May) in northern Thailand (see picture 9 and 10).
Picture 9, 10: Thailand Upland field rainy season versus dry season. The haze in
picture 10 is from forest fire smoke.

Rules 2 and 3 place limitations on resources, bamboo shoot and the Mae Du tree, that are
limited in quantity. Sixty-five percent of respondents mentioned cutting down the Mae
Du tree from the forest before it was a community forest and 7 mentioned how it was a
waste (personal communication, October 2010). Rules 6,7, and 8 reflect the community
forest committee’s limitations of time and technology, by making it mandatory for every
household to help with fire prevention and monitoring the forest.

“3. Collective –Choice Arrangements: Most individuals affected by the operational rules
can participate in modifying operational rules” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).
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In Huai Lu Luang: Strong. This principle was addressed through questions 33 to 37 and
through key informant interviews with the community forest committee. It was given a
strong rating because of community participation in the drafting of the rules, the overall
agreement of the rules expressed by respondents, and because of the organizational
mechanisms that allow for further participation (see table 7).
As shown in earlier discussions, the community forest rules were voted on by
household representatives, unanimously and 93% of villagers currently agree with the
community forest rules (personal communication, October 2010) (see table 9). In
addition, while the rules have not changed since 1977, there are mechanisms within the
community to change the rules if necessary. The village headman explained that if
anyone thinks that a rule should be added or changed, they will bring it to the committee,
and the committee members will vote (personal communication, October 2010). Eightyone percent of respondents understood who they could go to if they have a problem or
concern, (see table 8). Sixty-seven percent of those who responded that they did not
know who to talk to if they have a problem, use the forest less than 3 times per year.
Also, committee members and villagers expressed an openness to learn and adapt, “we
are willing to add more of the rules if anybody who has the specialized knowledge comes
to add more” (Interviewee 13, personal communication, October 2010). Eighty-one
percent of respondents said that they know who to talk to if they have a problem or
concern about the community forest.
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Table 8: Knowledge of where to take community forest concerns in Huai Lu Luang
by gender and age (n=32).
Female Male A* B* C*
Yes 11

13

5

11

8

No

2

4

1

1

4

*A= age group 18-34, B = age group 35-50, and C = 50+

Table 9: Responses about community forest rules for Huai Lu luang by total,
gender, and age (n=32).
Total
28
2
4
24
2
1
26
3
25
2

Do you agree with the
Community Forest Rules?
Do you think there are any
rules that should be added?

Females
12
2
1
11
2

Yes
I don’t Know
Yes
No
I don’t know
Do you think there are any
Yes
rules that should be taken
No
11
away?
I don’t know
3
Do you think the rules are
Yes
12
fair to everyone in the
Only to those
village?
that are
stubborn
I don’t know
2
2
*A= age group 18-34, B = age group 35-50, and C = 50+

Males A* B*
16
9
11
1
3
1
1
13
8
10
1
1
1
15
8
10
1
1
13
9
9
2
2

1

C*
8
1
2
6
1
8
1
7

1

“4. Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit common-pool resource conditions and
appropriator behavior, are accountable to the appropriators and/or are the appropriators
themselves.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).

In Huai Lu Luang: Moderate. This principle was based on the question 38 to 40 and
given a moderate rating because of the weight given to counter-cultural response of a
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community forest committee member who admitted to breaking the rules and turning a
blind eye when others cheated (see table 7). Ninety-seven percent of respondents
answered that they had never broken a rule before, and 57% said that they’d never seen
anyone break a rule before. Of the 43% who had seen or heard of anyone breaking a rule,
92% referred to the same two instances mentioned previously, where two separate
individuals unknowingly broke the rules by cutting down a Mae Du tree. The one outlier
for both of these questions was a community forest committee member who admitted,
“sometimes if anybody comes to say something about somebody come and break the rule
I just like close one eye and let it go and don’t catch the breaking of the rules”
(Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 2010).
Regardless of the occasional cheating, 97% of respondents still answered that they
trust the other members of the village and of the committee to abide by the community
forest rules. In addition, while the committee itself convenes roughly twice a year, the
committee members actively monitor the forest for fires and for rule breaking. The three
committee members interviewed mentioned checking the forest on a bi-weekly basis
(Interviewees 2,13, and 22, personal communication, October 2010).

“5. Graduated Sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to receive
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from other
appropriators, from officials accountable to these appropriators, or from both.” (Ostrom,
2002, p. 11).
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In Huai Lu Luang: Moderate. This principle was evaluated based on the community
forest rules and key informant interviews. It was given a moderate rating, because while
some evidence of graduated sanctions exist, they are minimal and the research did not
clarify if they are enforced (see table 7). According to the community forest committee,
only the two occurrences where two villagers cut down the trees, have the rules been
enforced and upheld and a steeper fine for an addition offence was not mentioned.

In

2000 and again in 2005, two separate incidences occurred where a villager cut down a
tree without permission. In both incidences the villager was unaware of the rule, and
they were informed and the fines were paid (community forest committee, personal
communication, October 2010). Rules have specific fines associated with infractions,
for example, a fine of 1500 baht (US $50) is levied for setting a fire in the community
forest, 2000 baht (US $67) for extending your upland fields into the community forest,
and the steepest fine of 3000 baht (US $100) for cutting a tree in the forest. Rule 10 also
addresses graduated sanctions by indicating that if anyone breaks one of the fined rules
(1-4) more than three times, he will be handed over to the RFD for prosecution.

“6. Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms. Appropriators and their officials have rapid access
to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among appropriators or between appropriators
and officials.” (Ostrom, 2002, p. 11).

In Huai Lu Luang: Very Strong. This principle was assessed primarily through a key
informant interview with the village headman as well as through interview question 41.
It was given a very strong rating because clear mechanisms exist within the village to
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handle conflict. When asked if they had ever experienced conflict before, 84% of
respondents answered no (see table 7). Four respondents answered that they have
experienced conflict, but that they resolved it amongst themselves. For example,
interviewee 10 explained “Quarrels sometimes happen when we do the fire line. Like
some people just sit down, while other. I have gotten angry, but then I forgive. We just
quarrel at that spot at the end reconciled” (personal communication, October 2010). The
village headman explained that there are three possible steps to conflict resolution in
Huai Lu Luang if the parties cannot resolve conflict independently. The first step is that
the religious committee will talk with both parties and if they are reconciled is no further
action taken. The second step involves working with the law committee. At this point
each party must pay a fine of 250 baht (US $8) to the village. If the conflict is still not
resolved, final authority rests with the headman, where they each have to pay a 500 baht
(US $16) fine and where they must reconcile (personal communication, October 2010).

“7. Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize. The rights of appropriators to devise
their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities.” (Ostrom
2002, p. 11).

In Huai Lu Luang: Moderate. This principle was evaluated through interview questions
42 to 43 and on the same premises as A6. The moderate rating is based on the fact that
while in practice Huai Lu luang is unchallenged by the RFD or the Thai government,
official the government has that right (see table 7). In practice, Huai Lu Luang villagers
are not challenged in their right to govern their own village and the community forest by
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the Forestry Dept or Thai Government. However, legally they have no explicit rights to
their community forest. In the future, politically, with the Mae Kok River Basin National
Park, the Community Forestry Bill, or the Chanot Chumcon existing de facto rights to
organize could be challenged.

Discussion
This research was designed to analysis the results on the basis of gender, age, and
ethnicity; however, the data presented challenges to that ambition. For the ethnic
categories of Black Lahu, Yellow Lahu, and Akha, the responses from the one Akha male
interviewed and the one Yellow Lahu male interviewed did not vary from their respective
age and gender categories, therefore, the sub-category of ethnicity was not discussed.
The data for resource attribute R1 and appropriators attributes A1 and A5 did not
lend itself to be dissected based on gender and age (see Appendix B). The interview
questions strove to distinguish between the individual and the household, but as
mentioned previously, the respondents did not distinguish between themselves and their
household use of community forest resources. This made it impossible to evaluate
gender and age variations in the use of food, timber, and NTFPs from Huai Lu Laung’s
community forest.
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Table 10: Frequency of community forest use by Huai Lu Luang villagers by gender
and age (n=32).
Total Female Male A* B* C*
Weekly

9

1

8

3

5

1

Monthly

4

0

4

0

2

2

Semi-Annually 6

4

2

3

2

1

Annually

4

4

0

1

2

1

Seldom

6

4

2

2

2

2

Never

3

1

1

0

0

2

*A= age group 18-34, B = age group 35-50, and C = 50+
Additionally, fewer women and individuals from age group C (50+) extracted
resources from the community forest (see table 10). Based on the survey of Huai Lu
Luang villagers (n=32), 40% of respondents reported that they use the community forest
on a monthly or more frequent basis, 31% used it semi-annually or annually, and 29%
reported that they seldom or never use the forest. Only one female accessed the forest
monthly and age group B (35-50) had the heaviest use of the community forest (see table
10). When asked “Who in the village do you think uses the community forest the most?”
, 72% of respondents (n=36) said that ages group A-B use it the most, 16% specified age
group C, 6% responded men, and 6% responded that men and women use it an equal
amount. This suggests that the majority of the community forest users are men in age
groups A-B (18-49). The terrain of the community forest is steep and present a challenge
for women and people in age group C. One female interviewee noted that, “for me, even
mushrooms I cannot get, because the community forest is very slippery. The women
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cannot go” (Interviewee 4, personal communication, October 2010). A 65 year old man
described his community forest usage, “I never go at all, I’m very old, I seldom go. I let
all the children go, but I stay back at home” (Interviewee 1, personal communication,
October 2010). In light of the apparent limited forest use by women and elderly
villagers, gender and age are considered in subsequent discussions only when specifically
noted by interview respondents. This affects the ability to access Ostrom’s (2002)
appropriators attribute A3 and design principle attributes one to four (see Appendix B).
Women and older villagers may still use resources from the community forest, but they
are not the predominant harvesters and their understanding of rules and boundaries does
not impact community forest usage.
Another one of the challenges these interviews and data collection methods
presented was bias: my personal bias, the interests and bias of UHDP personnel, and
sampling bias given how interviewees were selected. Through my past experiences with
Huai Lu Luang I know that I am biased in favor of Huai Lu Luang gaining a chanod
chumchon. UHDP and Huai Lu Luang villagers share that same wish. Through having
the village Headman, the five different committees (Youth Religion, Adult Religion,
Civil Government, Law, and Community Forest) responsible for identifying individuals
to interview, it is possible that they selected individuals who they thought would provide
desired information. This bias was tempered, however, by my translator soliciting six
interviewees at random, having six interviewees recommended (snowball effect) by other
interviewees, and through six interviewees solicited through village-wide speaker
announcements.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
Summary of Important Results
Thailand exhibits the common perception by governments and many international
conservation organizations that upland forest dwellers are unfit to be guardians of natural
resources; a perception this paper argues is unfounded. Huai Lu Luang village has
demonstrated the capacity to be sound guardians of their community forest in light of the
internationally accepted criteria developed by Ostrom (2002). They have met all of
Ostrom’s 18 key attributes of effective common-pool resource management based on a
survey of Huai Lu Luang villagers, interviews with key informants and repeated meetings
with the management committee of the community forest. In the attribute category of
resource characteristics, Huai Lu Luang’s community forest had strong capacity for
feasible improvement under management (R1), a moderate quantity of clear indicators to
monitor the resource (R2), a strong capacity for a predictable flow of resources (R3), and
a strong rating for a sufficiently small management area (R4). For the attributes of
resource appropriators, Huai Lu Luang showed a very strong dependency (salience) on
the community forest (A1), demonstrated a strong common understanding of the
resources (A2), showed a strong low discount rate (A3), demonstrated a strong level of
trust and reciprocity within the village (A4), had a moderate level of autonomy in selfgovernance (A5), and showed a very strong ability to organize (A6). Lastly, under
common-pool resource management design principles, Huai Lu Luang has demonstrated
a strong capacity to clearly define their boundaries (1), a strong capacity for the
congruence of the governing rules to the resource and local condition (2), a strong level
of participation by appropriators (3), a moderate capacity to moderate the resources (4), a
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moderate level of graduated sanctions for violators (5), a very strong capacity to resolve
conflict (6), and a moderate recognized right to govern their own resources (7).
Huai Lu Luang village’s capacity appears strongest in the formation of the
community forest itself, the existence and function of its management committee, and in
village unity. The community forest committee established clear parameters for the
community forest, and the vast majority of community forest users understand the rules
and boundaries of the forest and agree with those rules. Challenges arise in the areas of
governance autonomy and monitoring of the community forest. The lack of legally
recognized tenure rights prevents Huai Lu Luang village from exercising full, legal
autonomy over their community forest, even if their daily use and management of the
community forest remains unchallenged. Formal tenure does not guarantee the
sustainable use of a resource. Ostrom and Nagendra (2007) suggest
We conclude that simple formulas focusing on formal ownership will not solve
the problems of resource overuse...Solutions to overharvesting of natural
resources take time and effort to design so as to fit a local ecology and social
structure of the users and official involved. (Berkes 2004 and Frey 1997)
The identification and design of the solutions is directly tied to monitoring efforts, and it
is in monitoring their community forest that Huai Lu Luang exhibit the greatest
weakness. Huai Lu Luang villagers did express a willingness to learn and an ability to
follow instructions, like those given to them by the RFD. However, the recent relocation
of the village and related loss of traditional ecological knowledge and practice and
general lack of formal education regarding how or what to monitor in the community
forest are significant impediments to Huai Lu Luang monitoring efforts.
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Recommendations
The community forest committee surveys the community forest regularly, but
somewhat blindly. The village’s recent migration to the area precludes any detailed or
long-term historic understanding of local forest, soil or climatic conditions. In addition,
their inability to practice traditional long-fallow swidden agriculture due to the
availability of land has forced villagers to adopt agricultural practices very different from
those practiced by their ancestors. Nevertheless, Huai Lu Luang villagers possess useful
and practical knowledge about the community forest. For example, 17 survey
respondents noted that their elders, village leaders, or relatives had taught them about the
forest.
Moreover, Huai Lu Luang villagers do not have records regarding the condition
of their community forest. Ostrom and Nagendra (2007) suggest that in addition to
tenure, rigorous standardized monitoring is important to document changes in resource
conditions and prevent resource overuse or degradation. Through use of remote sensing
and on-the-ground ecological and social surveys, improved understanding of the status of
a resource can be achieved. Remote sensing allows for time-series analyses to identify
general changes in land-cover which if combined with on-the-ground monitoring of tree,
shrub, and groundcover composition, reproduction and growth can provide an assessment
of forest conditions.
It is more effective and sustainable to train villagers how to do their own
monitoring (e.g., GPS training and resource mapping) than to rely on outside
organizations. UHDP has the technical capacity to train CF committee members in the
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monitoring of their community forest, thereby empowering the committee and villagers
in the process. Remote sensing training, however, is more technical and would likely
require outside support. Nevertheless, perhaps an intern (working with UHDP or MMF)
or a university student could assist with and help train a village counterpart in remote
sensing analysis.
The static, RFD dictated, nature of rules presents another challenge in the
management of community forestry resources. The rules are guidelines the RFD wishes
the village to value and adhere to, but with more active and grounded monitoring of the
community forest, the capacity to modify and adapt rules based on changing ecological,
social and cultural conditions could improve the health and management of the
community forest. This could include restrictions on harvesting of certain forest products
depending on the season, or occasionally limiting cattle grazing to allow specific species,
such as forest bananas, to mature By applying their hands-on experience with the
community forest, additional education on forest health, and the results of monitoring
efforts, the community forest committee could potentially increase future benefits from
the community forest and better align rules and monitoring efforts with existing forest
conditions. Without a clear, documented understanding of current conditions in the
community forest, it is difficult to ascertain what changes may be warranted.
Education is not only important for community forest committee members, but
also for village residents as a whole. A Lahu translated sign containing the community
forest rules would make these rules understandable to a greater portion of the village.
However, in addition to knowing the rules more villagers need to understand the rules.
While 60% of survey respondents felt that the village had a common understanding of the
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community forest, 34% did not. Villagers may be aware of and adhere to community
forest rules without actually understanding the rationale for them. One survey respondent
noted “about 80% of the village has common understanding. The rest who don’t have the
common understanding, just follow. They cannot do or decide anyhow in the community
forest, because they have no authority.” (Interviewee 11, personal communication,
October 2010). The community forestry committee should make a better educational
outreach to the women in Huai Lu Luang, particularly the widowed and divorced,
without a male head of household. Interviewee 26 explained “My father was the
representative of the family to go and attend village meetings. When my mother divorce
from my father, we don’t know any news at all from the village” (personal
communication, October 2010). Occurrences like this can result in the breaking of rules
due to a lack of information and understanding.
In summary:
1. Monitoring: On-the-ground ecological surveys of tree, shrub, groundcover
composition, reproduction and growth.
2. Monitoring: Remote sensing for time-series analysis (could be done by interns
or University students)
3. Community Forest Committee Education: Committee needs more training in
the what to monitor (see 1). This could be done by NGOs like UHDP or by
the RFD.
4. Villager Education: Sign with the community forest rules needs to be
translated from Thai to Lahu.
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5. Villager Education: More effort needs to be done to keep women who are the
head of their households informed.

Broader Implications
This study argues that the chanod chumchon that would place Haui Lu Luang as a
sattelitte within the Mae Kok River Basin National Park is the best possible outcome for
Huai Lu Luang, as opposed to the community forestry bill. While the community
forestry bill seeks to protect the forests, it fails to incorporate a holistic and integrated
picture of villager’s land use, thereby encouraging a further degradation of the landscape.
The chanod chumchon allows for the village to establish their own guidelines for
management that fit with a more fluid understanding of forests and is less likely to
encourage rule breaking. In addition, the Thai government and the RFD, in approving
the chanod chumchon still have authority over how the forests are governed.
The situation of Huai Lu Luang villagers is not unique to their village, subdistrict, district, province, or even country. The establishment of Mae Kok River Basin
National Park would impact 12 other sub-districts in 4 districts and tens of thousands of
people. In light of Huai Lu Luang strongly aligning with Ostrom’s (2002) framework,
other communities could learn from Huai Lu Luang through existing networks, forming
coalitions, learning about their legal rights, and studying Huai Lu Luang’s specific
community forest management practices as a means to improve their own. This research
could also inform UHDP’s future work with community forestry and forest tenure
reform. Seven other villages in Mae Yao sub-district have a similar history to Huai Lu
Luang. They have all in-migrated from Myanmar in the last sixty years, they all face the
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same threat from the RFD’s Mae Kok River Basin National Park, and they have all
undergone similar efforts in establishing and designing their community forests (Ajan
Jamlong, personal communication, October 2010). It is possible that the research results
from this paper could be used by those communities to support their own efforts in
obtaining recognized forest tenure. The similar cultural and community forest design
histories of those seven villages suggests that there would be a strong correlation in
applying Ostrom’s (2002) framework to their community forests. By seeking to improve
education and monitoring efforts of community forests and by illustrating the strength of
their own practices as related to an internationally recognized and widely used criteria,
these villages may have a stronger case for the acquisition of a chanod chumchon for
their community forest as well.
There is a great deal of domestic Thai and international advocacy for forest
conservation and national parks. But as Ajan Jamlong has aptly observed “even the wild
animal has a place to stay in the jungle, but no land for the upland people” (personal
communication, October 31, 2010). This research suggests that Huai Lu Luang villagers
and perhaps many other upland people can contribute to effective forest conservation and
management efforts, while simultaneously deriving valued benefits from those forests.
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Appendix A: Break Down of Interviews

Table 4: Breakdown of Interviews
Number
of
Interviews

Setting

Location

#
Male

Public
Private

26
6

Headman’s
House

3

3

#16 House
Compassion
Office

3
26

2
12

#
Female

1
14
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MA

MB

MC

MBYL

MCAk

FA

FB

FC

3
2

6

4

1

1

1
4

5

5

1

2

1

5

5

5

5

1
4

1
2

Found
Provided
Snowballed
Speaker
Announcement

6
15
5
6

2
13
2
1

4
2
3
5

Morning
Afternoon
Evening

12
4
16

1
3
13

11
1
3

4

2
3
1

1
1

2
1
2

1

2
1
1
1

1
4

Solicited
Time of
Day

1
1
4

2
4

4

4
1
1

* M = Male, F = Female. A = Age group 18-34, B = Age group 35-49, C = age group 50
+, YL = Yellow Lahu, Ak = Akha. If not specified then Black Lahu
** It should be noted that most days in the evening the headman would make an
announcement reminding those people scheduled to interview with us to come down,
however on the morning of October 20th, 2010, it had rained the entire previous night and
that entire day so very few people went to work in their fields. Knowing we needed more
woman to interview that Headman announced that any woman currently not doing
anything should come down to the compassion office to be interviewed. That is how we
got the four women, and the one man accidently came as well because of that
announcement. It should be noted also, that 3 of my interviewees, #2, #13, and #22 are
community forest committee members, and although again I didn’t ask this specifically,
from observation #4 is married to interviewee #15, #16 is married to #18, #25 is the
daughter of committee member #12 and in the same household, and #29 is the brother of
#4 but has his own household and separate family. I know there are other relationships,
such as in-laws, parents, cousins, and siblings that I did not know about. However, in the
village many people seek spouses outside of the village because they are all related to
each other. I did clarify with my translator, however, to make sure that we did not
interview more than 2 people from the same household. Additionally the first three
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3

4

2

1

interviews were conducted at the headman’s house, and interview #16,17, and 18 were
conducted at interviewee #16 house, the rest were conducted at the compassion office
One error in the interviews is that I should have asked each individual how they came to
the village, whether it was through marriage, migration, etc, and I should have asked who
were the members of their family, and if anyone in their family was a CF committee
member.

Group Interview
I held three separate group interviews with the village headman and members of the
community forestry committee. As I had previously worked with the community forest
committee, many of the members and the village headman remembered me and they also
knew Mint as she had worked separating in the village two years ago serving as a
translator for an English speaking intern from Mekong Minority Foundation (MMF). I
introduced the purpose and objectives of my research and then shared the schedule and
interview plans.

10.18.10: I had my initial interview with three of the thirteen members of the community
forestry committee. I asked basic information about the village, community forest, and
the committee After I completed all of my interviews, which the headman or a committee
member would periodically check in on us to see how many more we needed and from
which category.
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10.28.10: I had a follow up interview with the community forest committee members and
the village headman in a relatively unscripted interview. For this meeting only four
members were present, one the same from before, but three different. I was told that
many of the committee members have paddy fields far away so when they are harvesting
rice they spend the weeknights out in the paddy fields and do not return to the village.
During this meeting other village members sat and listened to portions of the interview.

Community Forests Use Individual Interviews:
Question Framework:
Questions were scripted, aside from the occasional follow up or omitted question, to
answer criteria from Elinor Ostrom’s framework of attributes of resources and resource
users that are related to a communities ability to self-govern common-pool resources.
The questions centered on three broad categories of resource attributes, resource user
attributes, and design principles for long-enduring common pool resources, and the
interview questions were framed to address the following considerations:
Table 2: Interview Schedule
Date

Type of Interview

9.20.10

10.19.10

Planning Meeting
With Tui and
Jamlong
Car ride with Jamlong
+ Intro village
meeting
Interview with Pastor
+ Group Interview
with CFC
Individual Interviews

10.20.10

Individual Interviews

9.21.10

10.18.10

# Interviews
Completed
1

Category of
Interviews
Unscripted
Meeting

2

Unscripted
Individual +
Group Meeting
Informal Interview
+ Group Interview

NA

1 MBBL
2 MCBL
4 FCBL
1 FBBL
1 MABL
2 MBBL

At the Headman’s House

2

3
10
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Notes
NA

In CFC 1 man mostly talked

Rainy Day

10.21.10

Individual Interviews

8

10.25.10

Individual Interviews

3

10.26.10

Individual Interviews

7

10.27.10
10.28.10

Individual Interviews
Group Interview with
Headman and 4 CFC
Interview with A.
Jamlong

2
1

1MCBL
1 FBBL
3 MBBL
1 MBYL
1 FABL
1 MCBL
1 MABL
2 MABL
1 FBBL
2 FABL
1 FCBL
1 FBBL
1 MBBL
1 MBAK
2 FABL
Group Interview

1

Informal Interview

10.31.10

3 were at #16 house

Had to turn away one man
because his category MCBL
was full, but he sent his wife

Headman mostly talked

*Category: M= Male; F= Female; A = ages 19-34; B = ages 35-49; C = ages ≥ 50; BL = Black Lahu; YL = Yellow Lahu; AK =
Akha.

9.20.10, Initially I met with Ajan Tui, Ajan Jamlong and Mint to discuss my research and
plans and to make a schedule.

9.21.10 The initial meeting was an introductory meeting and planning meeting in which
Ajan Jamlong helped introduce me and my translator Mint. On the drive out to the
village, I was able to spend an hour asking Ajan Jamlong to fill me in on the current
situation with the village, community forest, and government. A practice that I had done
in previous years with the help of Ajan Tui who speaks Thai and English, in addition to
Karen.

My translator and I stayed at the Compassion International office, aside from the first
night where we conducted three interviews at the village Headman’s house, the majority
of the interview were conducted at the Compassion office. However, when we first
arrived on Monday, October 18th, due to an inability to get into the Compassion office,
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the village Pastor sat and talked with us, in an unscripted interview, for about two hours
and I was able to ask him basic background information on the village.

10.31.10. I also met again with Ajan Jamlong, to help fill in the gaps and seek
clarification on things I did not understand.

11.1.10 There are also a few notes from a personal three hour conversation I had with
Ajan Jamlong, without Mint, in Thai. It should be noted that my Thai is conversational
and not fluent, but I have worked with Jamlong for 3 years and he has a minimal
understanding of English so between the two we have learned to communicate with each
other efficiently.

Appendix B: Interview Questions Per Ostrom Category
Attribute Category

Attribute
Themes

Questions

R1) feasibility of
improving the resource
through management;

1. Do you think it is better now or before the
forest was a community forest? Why?
2. How else did you use the forest?
3. What products did you personally get from
the forest before it was a Community Forest?
4. Is there anything in the forest you used to
have access to that you wished you had
access to now?

Resource Attributes
R2) Indicators
available to monitor
changes in resource
quantity and quality, at
a relatively low cost.

5. How was knowledge about the forest
taught to you and by whom?
6. Give one example of something you
learned that you think is important.
7. How do you think you should use the
forest to keep it healthy?
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8. How well informed do you think the
community forest committee is about
managing the forest?

R3) predictable
resource availability;

9. Since the forest has been a community
forest do you use the forest more or less?
Why?
10. Are there any resources in the
community forest that you worry are too
scarce to be used? Why?

R4) sufficiently small
management area

11. Is there enough land in the Community
Forest to meet your needs?

1) Salience: household
dependence on the of
resource for major
portion of their
livelihoods;

12. What products do you personally get
from the Community Forest?
13. How many times per week do you go
into the community forest and what do you
do / get?
14. What are your family’s main expenses?
15. What is your main source of income?
16. Since the forest has been a community
forest do you get more or less income from
the forest? Why?
17. What products does your family use from
the Community Forest?
18. Do you think managing the community
forest is important? Why?

Resource User Attributes

19. What are the benefits to you or your
family for having access to the community
forest?
20. What other services does the Community
Forest provide?

2) common
understanding of the
resource;

3) low discount rate (or
few alternative income
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21. What services do you get from the
community forest that you couldn’t afford to
pay for or wouldn’t have access to
otherwise?
22. Do you feel that everyone in the village
has a common understanding of the forest?
23. What is your biggest concern about the
community forest?
24. How much income, if any, do you get
from the community forest each year?

options).

25. Outside of the community forest have
you planted any forest products that you use?
What?
26. Do you ever go outside the community
forest to collect forest products? Where?

4) trust and reciprocity
within the community;

27. .Do you trust the other members of the
committee and village to abide by the
community forest rules?

5) Autonomy:capacity
to determine access
and harvesting rules
(i.e.,govern) without
being undermined by
external
authorities/outside
forces;
6) organizational
experience and local
leadership

28. How were you involved in the process
that decided the community forest and the
rules?
29. Do you even see members from the
community forest committee out in the
forest?

1) clearly defined
boundaries;

30. Do you understand where the boundaries
are for the community forest?

2) Congruence:
applicability and
relevance of
governance rules;

Long Enduring Common
Pool Resources

3) Collective-Choice
Arrangements
participation by
affected community
members;

31. Do you know where the borders are for
the different sections of the community
forest?
32. How familiar are you with the
community forest rules?
33. Do you agree with the community forest
rules?
33. Do you agree with the community forest
rules?
34. Are there any rules you think should be
added?
35. Are there any rules you think should be
taken away?
36. Who in the village do you think used the
community forest the most? Why?
37. If you have a problem or concern with
the community forest do you know who you
can talk to? Have you ever?

4) monitoring of the
resource and
accountability of the
monitors;
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38. Have you ever broken a rule before and
not been caught?
40. Have you ever seen anyone break a rule
before?

5) graduated sanctions
for violators;
6) conflict resolution
mechanisms;

7) the recognized right
by government
authorities of village
members to govern
their own resources
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41. Have you had conflicts in the village
before, about anything? How were these
conflicts solved?
42. Do you think that having an official
community forest with rules and regulations
will help your village to keep the community
forest and not have the government take it
away?
43. Have you ever encountered a problem
with the government over using the
community forest?

